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Comment by 陳老頭 on September 9, 2024 at 2:30am

爱垦APP：量子纠缠（Quantum entanglement）

“意念科学”(Noetic Science，亦译“心智科学”) 和量子纠缠的相似之处，主要体现在它们对“非局限性”和“跨越时空联系”的关注。“意念科学”提出意识可能是非局限的，超越时间和空间限制，这与量子纠缠中的粒子无论距离多远，仍能保持关联的现象类似——

非局限性（Nonlocality）：量子纠缠表明，在量子世界，信息可以一种超越物理空间和时间的方式传递。“意念科学”中的某些理论，如集体意识、宇宙意识，强调意识也可能超越个体，具有非局限性。

心灵与物质的交互：“意念科学”关注的是意识如何与物质现实产生交互作用，而量子纠缠表明，粒子的量子态可能超越经典物理学中的因果关系。这种对非线性、非经典物理规律的探讨，为“意念科学”提供了理论基础，使探讨意识影响物质世界的可能性。

即时性：量子纠缠中的即时关联性（即一粒子的状态会瞬时影响另一粒子）常被用于类比“心灵感应”、超感知觉等现象，“意念科学”也试图解释这些超越传统科学的心灵现象。

虽然量子纠缠和“意念科学”的研究方向不同，一个是量子物理学的核心现象，另一个是关于意识和心智的跨学科领域，但它们的理论探讨在“非局限性”和“即时关联”上有相似的哲学意蕴，因此常被联系在一起。

“即时关联”（Instantaneous Correlation）vs. 卡尔·荣格（Carl Jung）“同步性”（Synchronicity）理论

二者有一定的关联。尽管它们来自不同的领域（量子物理学和心理学），它们都涉及某种跨越常规因果律的关联和现象，因此在某些层面上具有相似的哲学背景。

荣格的“同步性”理论：

“同步性”是卡尔·荣格提出的一个概念，指的是两件看似无关的事件在时间上同时发生，但它们之间没有明显的因果关系，而是通过一种“意义上的关联”彼此联系起来。荣格认为这些事件的“同时出现”有着深层次的心理或精神意义，而非简单的巧合。

同步性的核心要点：

1.非因果性：同步事件之间没有明显的物理因果链，它们是通过意义而非因果关系联系的。

2.共时性：同步事件在时间上同时发生，且往往带有强烈的主观意义感。

3.集体潜意识：荣格认为，同步性可能与人类的集体潜意识有关，某些共通的原型或象征可能在这些同步事件中被唤起。

4.精神与物质的交汇点：同步性探讨的是心理现象与物质现实的交叉点，暗示着心灵与物质可能在更深层次上相互关联，而不仅仅是分离的两个领域。

“非局限性”、“即时关联”与同步性：

量子物理中的非局限性和即时关联与荣格的同步性理论，有着某些相似的概念框架，尤其是在超越因果关系以及跨越时空的关联方面。

1.非局限性与超越时间空间的连接：

在量子纠缠中，两个粒子之间的关联是非局限的，即使它们相隔很远也能即时产生关联。这与荣格的同步性理论相似，后者指出没有直接的物理因果联系，但事件之间仍然通过某种超越空间和时间的方式相关联。

2.即时关联与共时性：

量子纠缠中的即时关联，意味着远距离的粒子状态会同时发生变化，这种同时性与荣格所描述的同步性中的共时性相呼应。荣格认为同步事件在时间上同时发生，具有深刻的心理或象征意义，而量子物理则从物理的角度描述了这种现象。

3.意义上的关联与量子意识的解释：

一些探索量子意识或Noetic Science的科学家认为，量子现象如纠缠可能为某些心灵现象提供解释。例如，量子物理中的非局限性现象，可能被用来解释如心灵感应或同步性这种“超自然”的心理现象。虽然这些理论在科学上还没有广泛接受，但它们为荣格的同步性理论提供了潜在的物理学背景。

4.心灵与物质的统一性

荣格认为，心灵和物质在更深层次上是不可分割的，同步性现象正是心灵与物质相互联系的表现。而量子物理中的非局限性和即时关联也暗示了物理世界中粒子之间的深层关联性，某些解释认为这反映了一个更统一的“宇宙网络”，心灵与物质的分界可能在这种网络中消失。

虽然同步性、非局限性和即时关联，分别来自心理学和物理学领域，它们都探讨了超越经典因果律的现象。荣格的同步性理论为探讨心理现象提供了超越传统因果链的视角，而量子纠缠及其背后的非局限性，则在物理学层面上表现出超越空间和时间限制的关联。因此，二者在跨学科的哲学讨论中经常被联系在一起，用来探索心灵、意识与物质世界的深层次关系。（爱垦網内部讨论笔记）

Comment by 陳老頭 on September 8, 2024 at 12:21pm

路易·阿尔都塞的《阅读〈资本论〉》

这是法国哲学家路易·阿尔都塞（Louis Althusser）及其团队在1970年出版的理论著作，旨于通过结构主义方法，重新解读马克思的《资本论》，从而阐明其核心理论。重点：

断裂理论

其概念认为，马克思在《资本论》中实现了从早期思想（如《1844年经济学哲学手稿》）向科学性更强的思想的转变。这种断裂是马克思主义的核心转折点，标志着马克思从一种“人本主义”转向一种科学的历史唯物主义。

阿尔都塞将马克思的工作视为科学，而不是意识形态。他批评了那些将马克思主义简单地看作是另一种意识形态的人，强调马克思的科学性在于其方法论的独特性。这种革命不仅是思想内容的改变，更是方法论和认知模式的根本转变，为社会和政治的革命性变革提供了坚实的理论基础。

此书对马克思主义哲学，特别是对《资本论》的解读产生了深远的影响，并推动了后来的马克思主义理论的发展。

阿氏引入了“问题域”（problematic）的概念，指的是某一理论体系中，问题被提出和解决的具体方式。这种分析方法帮助理解为什么不同的理论在不同的历史条件下产生，并且如何解读马克思的理论框架。

传统历史唯物主义中线性的历史观要打破，需要一种多重决定性和结构性的历史观，因为社会结构是多层次的，而这些层次在相互作用中决定了历史的进程。

 

理论断裂（Epistemological Break）

阿尔都塞提出，马克思在其思想发展过程中经历了一次重要的“理论断裂”，这标志着从早期人本主义和意识形态性的思考转向了科学的、结构性的分析。

从意识形态到科学： 阿尔都塞认为，马克思早期的著作受黑格尔和费尔巴哈影响较大，具有人本主义倾向。而在《资本论》中，马克思实现了对政治经济学的科学分析，摆脱了早期思想中的意识形态束缚。

方法论革命： 这种断裂不仅是内容上的变化，更是方法论上的革命。马克思采用了全新的分析工具和概念体系，如生产方式、生产关系等，来理解社会和历史。


意识形态的作用和再生产

阿尔都塞强调意识形态在社会结构中的作用，认为意识形态是维护和再生产现存社会关系的关键工具。

意识形态国家机器： 他提出了“意识形态国家机器”（Ideological State Apparatuses，ISA）的概念，指出教育、宗教、家庭、媒体等机构通过传播特定的意识形态，巩固统治阶级的地位。

思想革命的挑战： 要实现真正的思想革命，必须认识并挑战这些深植于社会结构中的意识形态机制，从而打破对人们思想的控制。

结构主义视角下的思想革命: 阿尔都塞运用结构主义的方法，主张对社会和思想进行结构性的分析，强调结构对个体和思想的决定性作用。

反对主体中心论： 他反对传统哲学中将个体视为自主、中心的观点，认为个体和思想都是由更广泛的社会结构和关系所决定的。

思想的客观性： 思想不是个人主观创造的结果，而是社会结构和物质条件的反映。因此，思想革命需要在结构层面上进行变革，而不仅仅是改变个人的观念。

哲学作为阶级斗争的形式

阿尔都塞将哲学视为阶级斗争的一种形式，认为哲学斗争反映并服务于社会中的阶级冲突。哲学的政治性： 哲学并非中立的理论探讨，而是具有明确的政治立场和功能。不同的哲学思潮代表着不同阶级的利益和视角。革命性的哲学实践： 通过发展和传播革命性的哲学思想，可以挑战和改变现存的社会秩序，为社会革命奠定思想基础。

科学理论的自主性

科学理论的自主性让科学独立于意识形态的影响，具备自身的逻辑和方法。科学与意识形态有所区分；科学提供了对现实的客观分析，真正的理解理论体系，才能和改变社会。换句话说，思想革命不仅涉及到内容的改变，更重要的是方法和理论框架的转变。而意识形态则往往一开始便歪曲和遮蔽现实，受到主观主义的束缚。（愛墾網内部分析笔记）

Comment by 陳老頭 on September 5, 2024 at 10:12am

詭異的Drift或Duree:文案本質是詩

從具體的廣告環境中，把文案抽離出來進行閱讀，這些文案仿佛具有了獨立的生命，因而提供了一種觀察廣告文案的新角度。

如果把廣告活動看做一種儀式的話，那麽，在這個儀式中，一個非常關鍵的因素就是廣告文案。廣告文案就像某種神秘的咒語。在很多宗教儀式中，咒語被認為具有神奇的力量，輕念咒語，人與宇宙萬物間溝通的開關一下子就打開了。好的廣告文案也是如此，一句看似不經意的廣告語，對消費者而言，仿佛是撬動心靈之門的按鍵。消費者被真實所觸動，然後領會、感悟，最終參與到消費的過程中。對於廣告活動而言，好的廣告文案，是靈魂，是活力之源，具有咒語一樣的魔力，它會觸發廣告效果的能量場，創造品牌與消費者的溝通。

咒語雖然是一種語言形式，但這種形式必然有不同於日常語言的特質。咒語是不可知的世界與可知的世界之間的橋梁，所以它必須創造一種表達方式，在其中必然有不可解的要素。這正是咒語的魅力和魔力所在。廣告文案也是對語言的一種重新發現和定義， 它把商品同消費者關係中不可知的層面通過語言表達出來，像咒語一樣激發消費者，形成對商品的感應。因而，廣告文案的語言表達必然具有某些反日常語言的特性，只有對語言的陌生化，才能讓語言本身的力量充分顯現。

在可知與不可知之間來去自如，所以，創作出一流文案的人必定是通靈者。他（她）雖然生活在常人中間，但就像遊弋在世間的貓一樣。貓的目光經常穿透了物質之墻，由於看到了前世、來世，以及其他豐富的跡象，它的眼神當然是飄移而詭異的。我看到許多優秀的文案創作者都具有貓一樣的神態與特質。無論他們呈現出怎樣的形態，或溫順、或威猛、或萎靡，無論他們是蜷伏，還是伸展，在特定的時刻，他們的眼中總是瞬間閃爍出迷離而決斷的光芒，就像貓在散漫的行走中突然警覺到未知形體的存在。

優秀的文案創作者，是社會的神經末梢。他（她）所表達的是自己的情感，但代表了不同群體最隱秘和最真實的內在需求和意識。他（她）對社會變遷所帶來的個體心理最細微的變化是如此敏感，以至於發出囈語一樣的呻吟，這種表達的結晶應該是詩，但同商業文化結合的時候，就成為了廣告文案。如南方朔先生所言，廣告文案是介於詩與非詩之間的。廣告文案用語言的形式凝聚和提煉了消費者的情感，並建立其同商品之間的精致鏈接，因而對消費者產生了引導和感染的力量。這是一種暈染，廣告文案賦予商品動人的意義和價值，吸引消費者關注和擁有商品。

(摘自：陳剛·序 李欣頻《誠品副作用》；本文作者為京大學新聞傳播學院副院長）

延續閱讀：文創叙事咒語

Comment by 陳老頭 on September 2, 2024 at 9:03pm

高阶创造力挑战机械人系列：“呼唤型造物”（Evocative Object）

以下三个成功的数字文化创意产品，在某种程度上体现了陈明发博士曾在爱垦網讨论过的“evocative object”概念，它们都融合了象征性、文化内涵和用户体验：

1. Google's AI-Powered Art Project (Magenta)

Google 的 Magenta 计划是个使用人工智能（AI）创作音乐、视觉艺术和其他形式作品的平台。该项目结合了先进的技术与创造力，允许用户通过简单的输入生成复杂的艺术作品。这种互动模式鼓励用户与技术共同创造，从而激发个人的创造力。

其特点是强调用户的参与和个性化创造过程，赋予用户艺术家的身份，让他们体验到创造的乐趣和成就感。

3. Sifteo Cubes

这是一套互动型玩具，结合了物理触控和数字交互。每个小立方体都具有独立的显示屏、传感器和互动功能，用户可以通过摇晃、移动或点击这些立方体来进行各种创意活动和游戏。

它通过物理和数字交互，增强了用户的沉浸感和参与度。这种设计不仅提供了娱乐功能，还鼓励用户通过互动来激发创造性思维。

3. LEGO Ideas

这平台允许用户提交自己的创意设计，并通过公众投票和评审来决定哪些设计将被实际生产。这个平台成功地将用户的创造力和集体智慧转化为实际的产品，体现了互动性和社区参与的重要性。

它通过集体创造力和参与式设计，成功地将用户的想象力和创意融入到品牌的产品线中，创造了高度个性化和象征性的玩具。

这些产品在各自的领域中成功地实现了用户的深度参与、创造力的激发和象征性表达，对开发“evocative objects”极有价值的参考。


在某种程度上，短视频服务领域的TikTok 和抖音符合“evocative object”（呼唤型造物）的理念，特别是在以下几个方面： 

1. 用户生成内容 (UGC)

创意表达平台: TikTok 和抖音都是用户生成内容（UGC）的平台，允许用户通过视频表达自己的创造力和个性。这种方式鼓励用户利用短视频形式表达自己的情感、想法和文化背景。这些平台为用户提供了创作和发布内容的工具和空间，使得每个用户的视频都可以看作是一种“evocative object”——即具有个人象征意义和文化表达的数字作品。

呼唤性和互动性: 用户可以通过评论、点赞、分享等方式与内容互动，甚至可以通过模仿、挑战等方式进行多次创作，这种互动性和内容的不断迭代和演变正是“evocative objects”理念中的互换性。

文化表达: TikTok 和抖音上的内容往往反映了用户所在的文化和社会背景，从舞蹈、音乐到语言和时尚，这些平台成为全球文化交流和创造力展现的场所。这种跨文化的内容创造和传播方式与“诗性思维”中的象征性和隐喻性有着共通之处。

社会意识: 虽然虚拟平台本身并不是专门为环保、ESG等社会议题设计的，但用户可以利用平台传播相关意识和可持续发展的理念。例如，用户可以通过创作内容来推广环保产品或倡导环保生活方式，这种内容本质上是一种具有生态意识的“evocative object”。

诗性叙事: 很多创作者通过短视频形式传达诗性内容，结合视觉、声音和节奏，营造出一种诗性氛围。这种表达方式与Vico的“诗性思维”紧密相连，展示了如何通过多种感官体验来触动和激发创造性思维。

短视频的情感共鸣: TikTok 和抖音的视频通常通过简短内容迅速引发观众的情感共鸣，这与“ecocative objects”设计中注重情感和审美体验的理念相符。视频中的音乐、视觉效果和情感表达能有效地触动观众的内心，形成强烈的情感链接。

TikTok 和抖音多方面都符合“evocative object”理念，尤其是在用户创造力的激发、文化表达和互动性方面。尽管它们是数字平台，而非物質产品，但它们成功地将用户体验、文化内涵和创造性互动结合在一起，成为当今数字时代的重要文化创意载体。

相关：

陈明发博士〈TikTok年代：刷亮华团品牌路径图〉

Jeffrey M. O’Brien·TikTok经济时代

爱垦搜索

Comment by 陳老頭 on September 1, 2024 at 2:38pm

高阶创造力挑战机械人系列：“意念思维”（Noetic Thinking）

近年来，“意念思维”或“心智科学”（Noetic Science）领域取得了一些显着的发展，特别是在对意识本质和其与物质世界的互动方面的探索上。

首先，有几项引人注目的研究获得了Linda G. O’Bryant意念科学研究奖。

这些研究涉及意识的非传统理解，例如“超眼视觉”（EOV，‘extra-ocular vision’
），即无需物理眼睛的视力，以及探索“意识代理”如何与亚原子世界交互的数学模型。这些研究试图挑战传统的科学观念，提出意识可能不仅仅是大脑活动的产物，而是一个更加基础性的存在。

其次，研究还扩展到意识如何超越个体并影响集体或宇宙级别的现象，例如通过“有组织的随机事件生成器”（OREGs，Organized Random Event Generators ）检测到的非本地同步性现象，这些现象暗示着意识可能在物理世界之外发挥作用。

此外，意念科学研究所（IONS，the Institute of Noetic Sciences）在提升人类潜能、心灵与物质互动以及集体意识等方面的研究也取得了显着进展。他们的研究目标是通过更深入地理解意识的本质，寻求解决长期存在的人类问题的新方法。

这些发展表明，“意念思维”正逐渐从边缘领域走向主流，并对传统科学和社会观念产生潜在的深远影响。

它是受承认的正规科学吗？

“意念思维”或“心智科学”（Noetic Science）虽然在某些学术圈子和机构中得到重视和研究，但在主流科学界中，它仍然不被广泛承认为正规科学。主要是因为意念科学涉及的很多领域，比如意识的非物质本质、心灵与物质的互动、超感知能力等，常常难以通过传统的科学方法进行验证。

主流科学通常依赖可重复的实验和严格的验证标准，而意念科学的许多研究则基于主观体验和难以量化的现象。这些研究往往涉及意识、直觉、超感知等领域，通常被认为是科学不可测试或难以验证的。

尽管如此，意念科学领域的研究者们正在努力通过更加严格的实验设计和跨学科的合作，试图将这些非传统的研究纳入更广泛的科学讨论中。例如，意念科学研究所就尝试通过实验来验证意识对物质世界的影响，这些努力旨在建立更加严谨的科学基础。

“意念思维”在主流科学中虽并未获得广泛承认，但它作为一个探索意识和人类潜能的领域，正在吸引越来越多的关注和研究兴趣。（爱垦网综合整理，仅供内部参考，敬请谨慎采用）

Comment by 陳老頭 on August 19, 2024 at 9:34am

[沉眠中轟然驚蟄]

我們的女士 / 身懷 / 痛楚 /身負十字架背負之苦 / 身懷痛楚，一再痛楚 / 宛若巨石上的疤痕般深刻 / 榔頭將她撬出粗岩之古老 / 睡夢 / 所啜泣之星辰四處雕琢 / 啜泣 / 刻印於石上之痛楚 / 他身負之痛楚 / 她背負過的痛楚 她聽見脆弱之形體崩裂 / 心知 /他 / 將一去不返 / 萬物靜止 / 不顧停留的微物 / 我們質問 / 沉重呼吸 一聲兩聲三聲 / 隨後暫停 / 永遠停歇 ——  引自第364頁

年輕女孩都很愁苦。她們喜歡自己悲愁。這會讓她們覺得自己很堅強。 —— 引自第68頁

她訴說她的愛，在半醒半睡之間 / 黑暗的時刻 / 欲語還休，低聲細訴 / 大地在她冬夜的沉眠中轟然驚蟄 / 綠草與花朵瞬間綻開 / 無視皚皚白雪 / 無視翩翩飛臨的皚皚白雪 —— 引自第14頁

徹日落雪 / 雪落徹夜 / 靜沉我窗 / 積雪白潔 /  有隻小家伙 / 羽翼豐滿 / 明亮斑斕—/ 外展雪般純淨容顏 / 明亮神采欣然成歡 / 傾心敘言 / 喜悅綿綿 ——克里斯塔貝爾·蘭蒙特 — 引自第72頁

（摘自从（Possession），作者: [英] A·S·拜雅特；出版社: 南海出版公司；出品方: 新經典文化；譯者: 於冬梅 / 宋瑛堂；出版年: 2008-5）

Comment by 陳老頭 on July 30, 2024 at 7:16am

Towards Topopoetics: Space, Place and the Poem by Tim Cresswell

Abstract: This essay focuses on the theme of poetry and place – a project I have called Topopoetics. It introduces the idea of topopoetics drawing on the work of Aristotle, Heidegger and more recent philosophies of place, dwelling and poetics.

The point is not to cover the familiar ground of ‘sense-of-place’ in poetry but rather to explore how the poem is a kind of place and the way in which poems create space and place through their very presence on the page, through the interactions of full space and blank space, stasis and flux, and inside and outside.

What can poetry tell us about space and place? Conversely, what can thinking about space and place tell us about poetry? These are the questions that motivate this essay. My aim is to both answer them and to reveal how spatial and platial thinking can inform forms of interpretation beyond the interpretation of space and place in the geographical world.

I develop a topopoetics – a project that sees poems as places and spaces. The distinction between space and place that is most often made is one in which space is seen as limitless, empty, divisible and subject to mathematical forms of understanding while place is seen as bounded, full, unique and subject to forms of interpretive understanding.

Place has been most frequently described as a meaning ful segment of space – as mere ‘location’ in space overlaid with things such as meaning, subjectivity, emotion and affect (Tuan 1977; Buttimer and Seamon 1980; Relph 1976; Cresswell 2014).

The definitions of space have become more sophisti cated thanks to interventions from critical theory and philosophy which have taken space out of the realm of the abstract and absolute in an attempt to reveal the work ings of space in the production of society (Soja 1989; Lefebvre 1991; Massey 2005).

At the same time work on place has added layers of power on the one hand (Cresswell 1996; Massey 1997) and a deeper philosophical role in human existence on the other (Casey 1998; Malpas 1999). There is not space here to rehearse all of the twists and turns in these debates. One aspect that is worth lingering on is the ques tion of which comes first, space or place? (Con't)

Comment by 陳老頭 on July 27, 2024 at 10:06am

It has become commonplace to see place as arising from space. In this sense space comes ‘first’. If space is an undifferentiated field – an abstract categorical axis of existence in the Kantian sense, then place has to occur in space. Places here are spatial moments, or points in space on which experience and meaning are layered.

Place comes after space. Space is a fundamental fact of the reality of the universe while place is what humans make out of it. The philosopher Jeff Malpas sees this as a relegation of place to the increasing importance of space in thought following the Renaissance: “The ‘rise’ of space is thus accompanied, one might say, by the ‘decline’ of place.

Indeed, in much contemporary thought, place often appears either as subjective overlay on the reality of materialized spatiality (place is space plus human value of ‘meaning’ …) or else as merely an arbitrary designated posi tion in a spatial field” (Malpas n.d.).

This way of thinking is turned on its head by philosophers of the phenomeno logical tradition following Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty who see spaces being formed out of the reality of place.

Place, here, becomes fundamental and primary while space is what follows once places come into existence as a kind of relation between places. In The Phenomenology of Perception Maurice Merleau-Ponty locates consciousness and intentionality not in the head but in the body.

How does the body relate to space? The most obvious way of articulating this is to think of the body as located (like place) in space where space is an external and continuous field in which the body exists and which the body has to navigate.

This is a body in Cartesian space that exists as an object. Merleau-Ponty rejects this view and argues instead for a ‘body-subject’ that exists in lived space – space which unfolds through the existence of the body rather than providing a precondition for the body. The human body produces certain kinds of orientation such as inside and outside, up and down, front and back and left and right that continually produce space rather than simply inhabit it.

As Merleau-Ponty put it: We must therefore avoid saying that our body is in space, or in time. It inhabits space and time … In so far as I have a body through which I act in the world, space and time are not, for me, a collection of adjacent points nor are they a limitless number of relations synthesized by my consciousness, and into which it draws my body.

I am not in space and time, nor do I conceive space and time; I belong to them, my body combines with them and includes them (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 161). Merleau-Ponty, then, insists that the bodily space is primary to external Cartesian space. Bodies are not simply in an already existing space – rather space is produced by the body.

A similar logic is at work in Heidegger’s account of the work done by building a bridge over a river. The bridge swings over the stream “with ease and power.” It does not just connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge designedly causes them to lie across from each other. One side is set off against the other by the bridge. Nor do the banks stretch along the stream as indifferent border strips of the dry land.

Comment by 陳老頭 on July 23, 2024 at 7:47am

With the banks, the bridge brings to the stream the one and the other expanse of the landscape lying behind them. It brings stream and bank and land into each other’s neighborhood. The bridge gathers the earth as landscape around the stream (Heidegger 1971, 150).

Heidegger’s bridge brings a place and a surrounding landscape into being. In so doing, it also produces space. The bridge as a place does not just connect pre- existing spaces or operate within a pre-existing space – it brings space into being.

In this sense, place comes before space. This is a reversal of the more frequent suggestion that places exist in space and that space comes before place. Heidegger is clearly making a different argument from Merleau-Ponty.

Nevertheless, what unites the two passages is an insistence on the way spaces are brought into being in relation to platial bodies and structures as active agents. Place comes first. One final preliminary point about place before moving on to a discussion of topopoetics. One of the defining qualities of place, across disciplines, has been the way in which places bring things together.

They are seen as syncretic mixtures of elements of multiple domains. Different scholars use different terms to describe this fact. Philosophers following Heidegger write of places as sites of gathering (Casey 1996). The geographer Robert Sack uses the metaphor of a loom to describe places as products of the process of weaving (Sack 2003).

Writers informed by the philoso phy of Gilles Deleuze and Manual Delanda refer to this process as assemblage (DeLanda 2006; Dovey 2010). Things mingle in places and places are constantly being made through gathering/weaving/ assembling and constantly being pulled apart. Among the things that are gathered in place are objects (materialities), mean ings (narratives, stories, memories etc.) and practices.

Philosopher Edward Casey puts this as well as anyone. Minimally, places gather things in their midst– where ‘things’ connote various animate and inanimate entities. Places also gather experiences and histories, even languages and thoughts. Think only of what it means to go back to a place you know, finding it full of memories and expectations, old things and new things, the familiar and the strange, and much more besides. What else is capable of this massively diversified holding action? (Casey 1996, 24)

1 Towards topopoetics

In the remainder of this essay I mobilize some of what has preceded in relation to thinking about poetry. I argue for poems as places (as well as about places) that can be interpreted spatially. The term topopoetics originates from the term topos as developed by Malpas and Casey in their readings of Heidegger and others (Casey 1998; Malpas 2012b).

Topo comes from topos (τόπος), the Greek for ‘place’. This is combined with poetics, which comes from poiesis (ποίησις), the Ancient Greek term for ‘making’. Topopoetics is thus ‘place-making’. The particular lineage I am invoking for topos derives from the philosophy of Aristotle. Importantly, for our purposes, topos appears in both accounts of how the world comes into being and as a figure in rhetoric. In rhetoric a topos is a “particular argumentative form or pattern” from which particular arguments can be derived.1

It is very much like a form in poetry – a sonnet or a villanelle. It has a particular shape. This rhetorical view of topos is linked to the world through the art of memorizing long lists by locating things on a list in particular places. “For just as in the art of remembering, the mere mention of the places instantly makes us recall the things, so these will make us more apt at deductions through looking to these defined premises in order of enumeration.” 2

Comment by 陳老頭 on July 20, 2024 at 6:51am

In Aristotle’s rhetoric it is important to choose the right kind of topos for the argument at hand, just as it is important to select the right form for a particular poet. It draws our attention to the importance of (among other things) the shape on the page. The richer meaning of topos emerged more fully formed in the writing of Martin Heidegger and has recently been elaborated by the philosopher, Jeff Malpas (Heidegger 1971; Malpas 1999, 2012a).

Here topos is mobilized through the idea of the topological to indicate the primary nature of place for being. To put it bluntly, to be is to be in place – to be here/there. The connection between poetry and the idea of place as the site of being is right there at the outset as Heidegger’s insistence on being as being-in-place originated from an encounter with the poetry of Hölderlin (Malpas 2006; Elden 1999).

Heidegger’s topological thought includes two key concepts – Dasein and dwelling. Dasein means (approximately) ‘being there’. It combines Heidegger’s career- long enquiry into the nature of being with a recognition that being is always placed – that existence is thoroughly intertwined with place.

The way that we make a home in the world is referred to as dwelling. The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is Buan, dwelling.

To be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell (Heidegger 1971, 145). How, exactly, people enact this dwelling (or fail to enact it) becomes a central object for philosophy in Heidegger’s later texts.3 In an important series of late essays Heidegger invokes poetry as a form of dwell ing. He goes so far as to suggest that it is an ideal form of building and dwelling. Poetic creation, which lets us dwell, is a kind of building.

Thus we confront a double demand: for one thing, we are to think of what is called man’s existence by way of the nature of dwelling; for another, we are to think of the nature of poetry as a letting-dwell, as a – perhaps even the – distinctive kind of building. If we search out the nature of poetry according to this viewpoint, then we arrive at the nature of dwelling (Heidegger 1971, 213).

This observation (linking poetry to its root meaning of ‘making’) gets right to the heart of the constitution of topopoetics. Poetry, as Heidegger observes, is a kind of building and thus a particularly important kind of dwelling. This building-as- dwelling, however, is more than the practical stuff of constructing in the correct way – it is, in Heidegger’s view, about the essential character of being-in-the world – being in, and with, place. 

1 For a discussion of topos, see Rapp 2010: 7.1.

2 Aristotle Topics 163b28.32.

3 Heidegger was a member of the Nazi Party, a membership he later denounced. There is no doubt that these ideas of dwelling were easily incorporated into a Nazi ideology of proper authentic (Aryan) dwelling counterposed to an inauthentic (Jewish, gay, Romany) form of (non) dwelling. Following Malpas I do not believe that this necessarily means that his ideas are irrecoverably infected.

An engagement with the philosophical basis of topos adds to our original definition of place (above) as a gathering of things, practices and meanings in a particular location. While place is all of these things this definition fails to underline the basic significance of being placed to being-in-the-world. A topopoetic account is one which recognizes the specificity of the nearness of things in place and at the same time focuses our attention on the way in which the poem is itself a form of building and dwelling.

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