Comment

Comment by luova ajatus on Saturday

14.The passing condition, which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unit [unite] or in the simple substance, is nothing but what is called Perception, which is to be distinguished from Apperception or Consciousness, as will afterwards appear. In this matter the Cartesian view is extremely defective, for it treats as non-existent those perceptions of which we are not consciously aware. This has also led them to believe that minds [esprits] alone are Monads, and that there are no souls of animals nor other Entelechies. Thus, like the crowd, they have failed to distinguish between a prolonged unconsciousness and absolute death, which has made them fall again into the Scholastic prejudice of souls entirely separate [from bodies], and has even confirmed ill-balanced minds in the opinion that souls are mortal.

這一在單元或單純實體中包涵並表現多樣性的暫時狀態正是所謂知覺，如下所說，知覺應該與統覺或意識區別開來。在這一點上笛卡爾派的觀點極其錯誤，因為他們把人們意識覺察不到的知覺視為是不存在。這也使他們認為只有心靈才是單子，而不存在動物的靈魂或其他的隱得來希。因而，他們像平常人一樣，不能把長期的無意識與嚴格的死亡區分開來，這使他們再次陷入經院哲學的偏見，使靈魂完全脫離軀體，甚至贊成那些心智不健全的人所持的靈魂有死的觀點。

解釋：萊布尼茨將作為精神實體的單子的一中之多的狀態稱為知覺。值得重視的是，當萊布尼茨把單子定義為精神時，他大大地拓展了精神的范圍：知覺不能等同於有意識的知覺，還應該包括整個無意識領域；精神不能等同於人的心靈，還應該包括「動物的靈魂或其他的隱得來希」。這樣一來，精神的疆界變得無比寬廣，從而得以真正成為世界的本體。

在此，萊布尼茨批判了笛卡爾派的否認「人們意識覺察不到的知覺」的存在、將精神等同於人的有意識的心靈的狹隘見解，認為這會將長期的無意識和嚴格的死亡混為一談。在萊布尼茨看來，軀體是無意識的知覺的某種產物，與被創造的單子不可分離，而否認無意識的知覺，必然會導致「靈魂完全脫離軀體」的錯誤見解。笛卡爾派的狹隘的心靈觀甚至會導向懷疑靈魂的永恆性，因為只有承認無意識的知覺，才能保證精神的持續不斷的存在。

15,The activity of the internal principle which produces change or passage from one perception to another may be called Appetition. It is true that desire [l'appetit] cannot always fully attain to the whole perception at which it aims, but it always obtains some of it and attains to new perceptions.

那種產生變化或從一個知覺向另一個知覺的過渡的內在原則的活動被稱作欲求。誠然，欲求不能完全達到它所指向的全部知覺，但他們總會有所收獲並達到新的知覺。

解釋：知覺和欲求是單子的兩個緊密聯系的根本規定。每個被創造的單子都以上帝的全知、全能和全善為其最終欲求目的，但這是不可能徹底達到的，因而每個單子都表現為永不停息的追求和運動。

16. We have in ourselves experience of a multiplicity in simple substance, when we find that the least thought of which we are conscious involves variety in its object. Thus all those who admit that the soul is a simple substance should admit this multiplicity in the Monad; and M. Bayle ought not to have found any difficulty in this, as he has done in his Dictionary, article 『Rorarius.』

當我們在我們所意識到的最細微的念頭中也能發現它包含著一些不同的對象時，我們就在自身體驗到了單純實體中的多樣性。因而所有那些承認靈魂是單純實體的人也應該承認單子中的這種多樣性；貝爾先生也不應該在此發現困難，如他在他的辭典「羅拉留」辭條中所做的那樣。

解釋：在此萊布尼茨以人的意識活動為例，再次論證單子的「一中之多」的特性：人的意識活動本身是「一」，意識活動總是有多樣性的內容則是「多」。

皮埃爾·貝(1647 –1706) ，是法國主張懷疑論的新教神學家在其《歷史與批判詞典》的 「羅拉留」（1485－1556，主張動物有理性）辭條中，以人的理性的軟弱無力這一懷疑主義思想批判了萊布尼茨的理性神學觀點。

Comment by luova ajatus on Thursday

17.Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in a simple substance, and not in a compound or in a machine, that perception must be sought for. Further, nothing but this (namely, perceptions and their changes) can be found in a simple substance. It is also in this alone that all the internal activities of simple substances can consist. (Theod. Pref. [E. 474; G. vi. 37].)

此外，必須承認，知覺以及依賴於知覺的東西，不能用機械的原因來解釋，也就是說，不能用形狀和運動來解釋。假設有一架機器，被制作得能夠思想、感受和擁有知覺，想像它在保持同一比例的情況下在尺寸上被放大，以至於人們可以像走進磨坊一樣進入它。在這種情況下，在考察它的內部的時候，我們只能看到一些部分作用於另一部分，而決找不到任何能夠解釋知覺的東西。因此，只能在單純實體中而非在複合物或機器中尋找知覺。況且，在單純實體中能被找到的只有這個（即知覺及其變化）。單純實體的全部內在運動也僅在於此。（參見《神正論》序言，[E. 474; G. vi. 37]）

解釋：萊布尼茨此處的例子是指能夠知覺的機器是不可能存在的，因為作為實體的特性的知覺是一種質的規定，不能用機械論的量的觀點來解釋。

18.All simple substances or created Monads might be called Entelechies, for they have in them a certain perfection (echousi to enteles); they have a certain self-sufficiency (autarkeia) which makes them the sources of their internal activities and, so to speak, incorporeal automata. (Theod. 87.)

所有的單純實體或被創造的單子都可被稱為隱得來希，因為它們自身之內都具有某種完滿性；他們具有某種自足性，使得他們成為自身內在活動的源泉，也就是說，無形體的自動機。（參見《神正論》，第87節）

解釋：「隱得來希」在希臘文中原義指「完滿」、「完整」，亞里斯多德用「隱得來希」一詞表示從潛能到現實的運動，萊布尼茨的「隱得來希」強調單子的圓滿性和自足性，更接近該詞的本義。

單子或「隱得來希」的圓滿性和自足性是有限的，要不然就和上帝沒有區別了。單子為上帝所創造並被賦予了運動的原則，因而每個單子都是自我運動的、自足的，不需要任何外界的影響。

第三部分 單子的等級 （第19節—第30節）

19.If we are to give the name of Soul to everything which has perceptions and desires [appetits] in the general sense which I have explained, then all simple substances or created Monads might be called souls; but as feeling [le sentiment] is something more than a bare perception, I think it right that the general name of Monads or Entelechies should suffice for simple substances which have perception only, and that the name of Souls should be given only to those in which perception is more distinct, and is accompanied by memory. 

如果我們把靈魂一詞賦予具有我所解釋的一般意義的知覺和欲求的所有事物，那麼所有的單純實體或被創造的單子都可被稱作靈魂；但因為感受包含了比赤裸的知覺更多的東西，所以我同意單子或隱得來希這種一般的名稱對於僅僅具有知覺的單子而言是足夠的，靈魂這一名稱應該被給與那些具有更清晰的知覺、有記憶相伴隨的單子。 

解釋：萊布尼茨按知覺的清晰程度把單子分成三個等級：最低級的是赤裸的單子，只具有最含混的無意識的知覺；其次是靈魂（soul）,具有有意識的知覺即感受，有記憶相伴隨；再次是心靈（mind）或精神(spirit),其知覺具有自我意識和理性。

20.For we experience in ourselves a condition in which we remember nothing and have no distinguishable perception; as when we fall into a swoon or when we are overcome with a profound dreamless sleep. In this state the soul does not perceptibly differ from a bare Monad; but as this state is not lasting, and the soul comes out of it, the soul is something more than a bare Monad. (Theod. 64.)

我們在自己身上體驗到一種情形，即我們對之沒有任何記憶且沒有任何可辨識的知覺；如我們陷入昏迷或深沉的無夢的睡眠的時候。在這種狀態下靈魂與赤裸的單子之間沒有可覺察的區別；但由於這一狀態是不持久的，靈魂會從中擺脫出來，靈魂是某種比赤裸的單子更豐富的東西。（參見《神正論》第64節）

Comment by luova ajatus on Wednesday

21.And it does not follow that in this state the simple substance is without any perception. That, indeed, cannot be, for the reasons already given; for it cannot perish, and it cannot continue to exist without being affected in some way, and this affection is nothing but its perception. But when there is a great multitude of little perceptions, in which there is nothing distinct, one is stunned; as when one turns continuously round in the same way several times in succession, whence comes a giddiness which may make us swoon, and which keeps us from distinguishing anything. Death can for a time put animals into this condition.

這並不意味著，在這一狀態中單純實體沒有任何知覺。根據前面給出的理由這是不可能的；因為它不能在沒有某種性質也就是知覺的情況下停止存在或繼續存在。可是當一個人具有無數微小的知覺，其中卻無一清晰，這時他就昏迷了；就象朝某個方向連續轉圈若干次，會使我們頭暈目眩而昏厥，不能分辨任何東西。死亡能夠在某段時間內把動物置於這種狀態。

22.And as every present state of a simple substance is naturally a consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present is big with its future; (Theod. 350.)

既然單純實體的現在狀態是其前一狀態的自然結果，同樣地，它的現在就孕含了將來。（參見《神正論》第350節）

23.And as, on waking from stupor, we are conscious of our perceptions, we must have had perceptions immediately before we awoke, although we were not at all conscious of them; for one perception can in a natural way come only from another perception, as a motion can in a natural way come only from a motion. (Theod. 401-403.)

由於我們一從昏迷中覺醒過來就意識到知覺，我們在覺醒之前一定也具有知覺，盡管我們完全不能意識到它們；因為知覺只能以自然的方式源於另一（在先的）知覺，就象一個運動以自然的方式源於另一（在先的）運動①。（參見《神正論》第401-403節）

24.It thus appears that if we had in our perceptions nothing marked and, so to speak, striking and highly-flavoured, we should always be in a state of stupor. And this is the state in which the bare Monads are.

由此可知，如果我們知覺中沒有那些清晰的，也就是說，顯著的和極有特色的東西，我們就會永遠處於昏迷之中。而這正是赤裸的單子所處的狀態。

解釋：在第20－24節中，萊布尼茨認為人的無意識狀態與赤裸的單子是非常類似的，即都沒有任何清晰的知覺，從而說明赤裸的單子確實是存在的或至少其存在是可以設想的。萊布尼茨認為，無意識的知覺必然是存在的，否則單子就失去其恆存性而不成其為實體，人在昏迷或無夢的睡眠這些無意識狀態中就陷入死亡而無法蘇醒了。

Comment by luova ajatus on July 21, 2025 at 10:47am

25.We see also that nature has given heightened perceptions to animals, from the care she has taken to provide them with organs, which collect numerous rays of light, or numerous undulations of the air, in order, by uniting them, to make them have greater effect. Something similar to this takes place in smell, in taste and in touch, and perhaps in a number of other senses, which are unknown to us. And I will explain presently how that which takes place in the soul represents what happens in the bodily organs.

我們也看到，大自然通過賦予動物以感覺器官而給與了它們強化的知覺，這些感覺器官把無數的光線和空氣的波動收集起來，通過把它們結合起來而使其具有更顯著的效果。同樣的事情也發生於嗅覺、味覺和觸覺，以及大概不為人所知的一些其他的感官。我不久將解釋，為何在靈魂中所發生的事能夠反映感官中所發生的事。

解釋：動物的單子（靈魂）因具有感覺器官而擁有了較清晰的、有意識的、有記憶的知覺。至於物質性的感官何以能夠與無形體的靈魂相溝通這一問題，萊布尼茨用他的「前定和諧」理論加以解釋。

26. Memory provides the soul with a kind of consecutiveness, which resembles [imite] reason, but which is to be distinguished from it. Thus we see that when animals have a perception of something which strikes them and of which they have formerly had a similar perception, they are led, by means of representation in their memory, to expect what was combined with the thing in this previous perception, and they come to have feelings similar to those they had on the former occasion. For instance, when a stick is shown to dogs, they remember the pain it has caused them, and howl and run away. (Theod. Preliminary Discourse, sec. 65.)

記憶為靈魂提供一種連貫性，這種連貫性雖類似於理性，卻有必要與理性區別開來。我們注意到，如果動物以前曾被某物毆打，當它們又見到此物時，記憶中的表象會驅使它們去期待在以往的知覺中與該物相連的東西，它們會產生與以前的情形中類似的感受。例如，當人向狗舉起棍子的時候，狗會記起棍子曾造成的痛苦，就嚎叫著跑開了。(參見《神正論》初步論述，第65節)

27. And the strength of the mental image which impresses and moves them comes either from the magnitude or the number of the preceding perceptions. For often a strong impression produces all at once the same effect as a long-formed habit, or as many and oft-repeated ordinary perceptions.

那些刺激並驅動它們的心理印象的力量源於以往知覺的強度或數量。因為一個強烈的印象常立即產生與長期形成的習慣或許多經常重復的普通知覺相同的效果。

解釋：記憶使得動物能夠將特定的知覺聯系在一起形成習慣性的聯想，從而使動物的行為具有某種一貫性。

Comment by luova ajatus on July 10, 2025 at 8:59am

28. In so far as the concatenation of their perceptions is due to the principle of memory alone, men act like the lower animals, resembling the empirical physicians, whose methods are those of mere practice without theory. Indeed, in three-fourths of our actions we are nothing but empirics. For instance, when we expect that there will be daylight to-morrow, we do so empirically, because it has always so happened until now. It is only the astronomer who thinks it on rational grounds.

就其知覺的連貫性僅在於記憶的原則而言，人的行為類似於動物，就象經驗主義的醫生，只有實踐而缺乏理論。實際上，我們在自身的四分之三的行為上都是經驗主義者。例如，當我們預期明天會有白晝的時候，我們只是憑經驗，因為直到目前事情一直是這樣的。只有天文學家才能以理性的根據對此進行思考。

解釋：作為理性主義者，萊布尼茨認為只有普遍性的理性知識才使人與動物區別開來，人的經驗與動物的聯想並沒有本質不同。

29. But it is the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths that distinguishes us from the mere animals and gives us Reason and the sciences, raising us to the knowledge of ourselves and of God. And it is this in us that is called the rational soul or mind [esprit].

但只有必然的、永恆的真理才將我們與單純的動物區分開來，給予我們理性和科學，將我們提升到具有關於我們自身和上帝的知識。這就是我們之內所謂的理性靈魂或心靈。

30. It is also through the knowledge of necessary truths, and through their abstract expression, that we rise to acts of reflexion, which make us think of what is called I, and observe that this or that is within us；and thus, thinking of ourselves, we think of being, of substance, of the simple and the compound, of the immaterial, and of God Himself, conceiving that what is limited in us is in Him without limits. And these acts of reflexion furnish the chief objects of our reasonings. (Theod. Pref. [E. 469; G. vi. 27].)

也正是憑借必然真理的知識以及它們的抽象表達，我們才提升到具有反思活動，這使我們能夠思維所謂「自我」，並觀察到這或那處於「我們」之中；就這樣，通過思維自我，我們也就思維到存在、實體，思維到單純物和複合物，以及非實在之物和上帝自身，並設想在我們身上有限的卻會在上帝之中沒有限制。這些反思的活動為我們（當前的形而上學）①的推理提供了主要對象。（參見《神正論》前言，[E. 469; G. vi. 27]）

解釋：作為理性靈魂或心靈，憑借著對必然真理的理性知識的認識，而擁有了反思活動，具有了自我意識，並進而獲得了有關存在、實體、複合物、上帝等的哲學真理。值得注意的是，在萊布尼茨那里，自我意識與理性的反思能力緊密相連、密不可分，而對自我意識的反思則是形而上學的源泉。作為德國哲學之父，萊布尼茨的這種注重主體性的哲學傾向對德國古典哲學的發展有著非常深遠的影響。

第四部分 理性的兩大原則和兩種真理 （第31節—第37節）

31. Our reasonings are grounded upon two great principles, that of contradiction, in virtue of which we judge false that which involves a contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to the false; (Theod. 44, 169.)

我們的推理建立在兩大原則之上，其一為矛盾律，借助於這一原則，我們將包含矛盾者判斷為假，並將與假的相對立或相矛盾的判斷為真。（參見《神正論》第44節，第169節）

Comment by luova ajatus on July 5, 2025 at 4:43pm

32.And that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known by us. (Theod. 44, 196.)

其二為充足理由律，借助於這一原則，我們認為，除非有為什麼是這樣而不是那樣的充足理由，否則就沒有事實是真實的或存在的，沒有陳述是正確的，盡管這些理由常常不為我們所知。（參見《神正論》第44節，第196節）

33.There are also two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and those of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible； truths of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, its reason can be found by analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and truths, until we come to those which are primary. (Theod. 170, 174, 189, 280-282, 367. Abrege, Object. 3.)

也存在著兩種真理，即推理的真理和事實的真理。推理的真理是必然的，其反面是不可能的；事實的真理是偶然的，其反面是可能的。當某個真理是必然的，其理由就可以通過分析而發現，可以將它分解為更簡單的觀念和真理，直到發現那些最基本的東西。（參見《神正論》第170節、第174節、第189節、第280－282節、第367節。節略，異議3）

解釋：萊布尼茨的理性的兩大原則矛盾律和充足理由律分別對應於兩種不同的真理，即推理的真理和事實的真理，或者必然的真理和偶然的真理。在他看來，推理的真理或必然真理指是指必然為真的同一性的陳述，即通過人的理性分析，可發現該陳述的謂詞包含語主詞之中。由此可知，與之相應的矛盾律的本質就在於a﹦a,因而萊布尼茨有時又將矛盾律稱為同一律（principle of identity）。他認為，邏輯學和數學就是建立在矛盾律或同一律的基礎上的，是相關於邏輯世界或可能世界的。

而事實的真理或偶然的真理則是相關於現實世界的陳述，並不必然為真，其反面總是可能的。例如，昨天雖然沒有下雨，但昨天也完全有可能下雨，這在邏輯上並不包含矛盾。也就是說，關於現實世界的陳述，至少就人的理性而言，不能視作謂詞包含於主詞之中的同一性陳述。那麼事實真理或偶然真理的真理性就不是源於矛盾律，而必須另有來源，即充足理由律。

34.It is thus that in Mathematics speculative Theorems and practical Canons are reduced by analysis to Definitions, Axioms and Postulates.

因而，在數學上思辨的原理和實踐的法則,可通過分析而歸結為定義、公理和公設。

Comment by luova ajatus on July 3, 2025 at 9:04pm

35.In short, there are simple ideas, of which no definition can be given; there are also axioms and postulates, in a word, primary principles, which cannot be proved, and indeed have no need of proof; and these are identical propositions, whose opposite involves an express contradiction. (Theod. 36, 37, 44, 45, 49, 52, 121-122, 337, 340-344.)

最後，有一些不能給出定義的簡單觀念；還有一些公理和公設，即基本的原理，是不能證明的，也沒必要卻證明；這些是同一性的陳述，其反面包含著明顯的矛盾。（參見《神正論》第36節、第37節、第44節、第45節、第49節、第52節、第121－122節、第337節、第340－344節）

36.But there must also be a sufficient reason for contingent truths or truths of fact, that is to say, for the sequence or connexion of the things which are dispersed throughout the universe of created beings, in which the analyzing into particular reasons might go on into endless detail, because of the immense variety of things in nature and the infinite division of bodies. There is an infinity of present and past forms and motions which go to make up the efficient cause of my present writing; and there is an infinity of minute tendencies and dispositions of my soul, which go to make its final cause.

但充足理由也必須存在於偶然真理或事實真理，也就是說，存在於散布在創造物的世界中的事物的序列或聯系，在此，對特殊理由的分析可以進展到無窮的細節，因為自然界中的事物無比繁復以及物體可以無限分割。無數的現在和過去的狀態和運動構成了我當前寫作的動力因；而我靈魂中的無數的細微傾向和性情構成了它的目的因。

37.And as all this detail again involves other prior or more detailed contingent things, each of which still needs a similar analysis to yield its reason, we are no further forward；and the sufficient or final reason must be outside of the sequence or series of particular contingent things, however infinite this series may be.

由於所有這些細節又包含其他的在先的或更細微的偶然事物，而這些仍然需要同樣的分析來獲得其理由，這樣我們就不能再進一步了；充足的或最終的理由必須存在於特殊的偶然事物的序列之外，無論這一序列是如何無限。

解釋：作為事實真理的原則的充足理由律的內容很簡單，即沒有任何事物的存在或發生是沒有理由的，也就是說，對任何事情我們都可以追問「問什麼」。這一貌似空洞的原則至少有兩個重大的涵義：其一，它意味著世界有著自在的秩序，而且這種秩序在原則上能夠被理性所認識，這鮮明地表現出萊布尼茨哲學的理性主義色彩；其二，它被萊布尼茨用來引出對上帝存在的宇宙論證明，即由於事物之間的普遍聯系，對任一事物的充足理由的追朔都會延伸到整個世界，而世界作為整體的充足理由只能在世界之外，即超越的上帝。參見萊布尼茨《關於理性與神恩的基於理性的原則》第8節。

第五部分 上帝 （第38節—第46節）

Comment by luova ajatus on June 30, 2025 at 9:24pm

Thus the final reason of things must be in a necessary substance, in which the variety of particular changes exists only eminently, as in its source; and this substance we call God. (Theod. 7.)

因而事物的最終理由必須存在於一個必然實體之中，在這一實體中，特殊變化的細節僅僅卓越地存在著，就像在其源頭一樣；我們將這一實體稱為上帝。（參見《神正論》第7節）

解釋：「卓越地」（eminently）與「形式地」（formally）相對應，為經院哲學術語，但在萊布尼茨時代仍很流行。甲「形式地」存在於乙中，是指甲物理地作為乙的一個部分而存在，如馬腿之於馬；而甲「卓越地」存在於乙中，不是就物理意義而是就解釋或邏輯意義而言，即乙是邏輯在先的，對甲的解釋要依賴於乙。

所謂「特殊變化的細節僅僅卓越地存在」於上帝之中，也就是說上帝是萬事萬物的充足理由。

39.Now as this substance is a sufficient reason of all this variety of particulars, which are also connected together throughout; there is only one God, and this God is sufficient.

這一實體是所有特殊事物的充足理由，而這些特殊事物是普遍相關聯的；只有一個上帝，而且這一上帝就足夠了。

解釋：由於上帝為世界提供了充足理由，而且上帝是其自身的充足理由，因而充足理由律的追問之鏈在上帝這里終結了，即只有一個上帝就足夠了。而如果存在多個上帝的話，又會引出一系列的「為什麼」，如每個上帝的特性是什麼，上帝之間的關係如何等等。在萊布尼茨看來，只有承認上帝的唯一性才能保證上帝是最終的充足理由。

40.We may also hold that this supreme substance, which is unique, universal and necessary, nothing outside of it being independent of it,—this substance, which is a pure sequence of possible being, must be illimitable and must contain as much reality as is possible.

我們還可得出，這一最高實體是唯一的、普遍的和必然的，沒有任何事物能在它之外而獨立於它，這一實體，作為可能存在的直接結果①，一定是沒有限制的，且包含盡可能多的實在。

解釋：「沒有任何事物能在它（上帝）之外而獨立於它」，這句話貌似斯賓諾莎的泛神論口吻，但萊布尼茨的意思並不是指萬物存在於上帝自身之中，而是指萬物處於超越的上帝的作用和統轄之中。可以用第38節中的經院哲學術語來解釋，即萬物卓越地而非形式地存在於上帝之中。

接下來，萊布尼茨按照安瑟爾謨的本體論證明的思路，從上帝的本質或觀念（可能存在）推出上帝必然存在。

Comment by luova ajatus on June 24, 2025 at 8:04pm

41.Whence it follows that God is absolutely perfect; for perfection is nothing but amount of positive reality, in the strict sense, leaving out of account the limits or bounds in things which are limited. And where there are no bounds, that is to say in God, perfection is absolutely infinite. (Theod. Pref.22, [E. 469 a; G. vi. 27].)

由此可知，上帝是絕對完滿的；因為嚴格意義上的完滿性正是指積極實在性之全部，而將有限之物的局限和限度排除在外。在沒有局限之處，即在上帝中，完滿性是絕對無限的。（參見《神正論》序言 第22節[E. 469 a; G. vi. 27].）

解釋：在萊布尼茨那里，上帝的絕對完滿性和無限性的一個重要表現是，上帝的知覺是徹底清晰的，因而上帝得以作為純粹的精神而存在。而其他的單子的知覺則有不同程度的混亂，必須與一個形體相伴隨，因為形體正是混亂的知覺的某種產物，是單子的有限性和被動性的重要表現。

42.It follows also that created beings derive their perfections from the influence of God, but that their imperfections come from their own nature, which is incapable of being without limits. For it is in this that they differ from God. An instance of this original imperfection of created beings may be seen in the natural inertia of bodies. (Theod. 20, 27-30, 153, 167, 377－378，380；Abridgmet,obj.5.)

過本體論證明從上 帝的本質得出上存在。還可得出，創造物的完滿性源於上帝的影響，而其不完滿性則源於自身的不能沒有局限的本性。正是在此它們與上帝區別開來。創造物的原初的不完滿性的例證可在其軀體的自然的惰性中發現。（參見《神正論》第20節, 第20節, 第27-30節, 第153節, 第167節, 第377-378節, 第380節；節略，異議5）

解釋：上帝的創世並未創造事物的本質，事物的本質永恆地存在於可能世界之中。上帝的創世是指上帝挑選出一些事物的本質使其現實化，以構成一個所有可能世界中的最佳世界。因而創造物的局限性源於自身的本質或概念。

43.It is farther true that in God there is not only the source of existences but also that of essences, in so far as they are real, that is to say, the source of what is real in the possible. For the understanding of God is the region of eternal truths or of the ideas on which they depend, and without Him there would be nothing real in the possibilities of things, and not only would there be nothing in existence, but nothing would even be possible. (Theod. 20.)

同樣真實的是，上帝不僅是存在的源泉，也是本質的源泉，就本質是真實的而言，也就是說，是可能性中真實的東西的源泉。因為上帝的理智是永恆的真理或觀念的依附之處，沒有上帝就沒有任何在可能性中真實之物，不僅沒有任何東西存在，甚至沒有任何東西是可能的。（參見《神正論》第20節）

解釋：本質或觀念只要符合矛盾律，即不包含自相矛盾的東西，就是真實的，也就是說具有某種實在性，這些真實的本質或觀念只能存在於上帝的理智之中。這構成了萊布尼茨的另一個對上帝存在的證明。

44.For if there is a reality in essences or possibilities, or rather in eternal truths, this reality must needs be founded in something existing and actual, and consequently in the existence of the necessary Being, in whom essence involves existence, or in whom to be possible is to be actual. (Theod. 184-189, 335.)

如果在本質或可能性中，或者在必然真理中存在著某種實在，那麼這一實在就必須奠基於某種存在和現實之物，也就是必然實體的存在上，這種必然實體的本質包含了存在，或者在其中可能的都是現實的。（參見《神正論》第184－189節，第335節）

Comment by luova ajatus on June 15, 2025 at 1:00pm

45.Thus God alone (or the necessary Being) has this prerogative that He must necessarily exist, if He is possible. And as nothing can interfere with the possibility of that which involves no limits, no negation and consequently no contradiction, this [His possibility] is sufficient of itself to make known the existence of God a priori. We have thus proved it, through the reality of eternal truths. But a little while ago we proved it also a posteriori, since there exist contingent beings, which can have their final or sufficient reason only in the necessary Being, which has the reason of its existence in itself.

因而只有上帝（或必然存在）才具有這一特權，即只要他是可能的就必然存在。既然什麼都不可能妨礙那不包含限制、否定，從而不包含矛盾的東西的可能性，這種可能性自身就足以先天地證明上帝的存在。我們曾通過永恆真理的實在性來證明上帝的存在（第43節）。而不久前我們也後天地對此進行了證明（第38節），因為存在著偶然的事物，它們的最後的或充足的理由只能在必然存在之中，而必然存在則在自身中有其存在的理由。

解釋：萊布尼茨在此提到了對上帝存在的三種證明，前兩種是先天的，即本體論證明和基於永恆真理的實在性的證明，第三種是後天的，即基於充足理由律的證明。

46. We must not, however, imagine, as some do, that eternal truths, being dependent on God, are arbitrary and depend on His will, as Descartes, and afterwards M. Poiret, appear to have held. That is true only of contingent truths, of which the principle is fitness [convenance] or choice of the best, whereas necessary truths depend solely on His understanding and are its inner object. (Theod. 180-184, 185, 335, 351, 380.)

我們不能像有些人，如笛卡爾和後來的波瓦雷①那樣，認為永恆的真理既然依賴於上帝，就是偶然的，依賴於上帝的意志。這一觀點只是對於偶然真理而言是真實的，偶然真理的原則是合適性或對最佳者的選擇，而必然真理則僅僅依賴於上帝的理智，是上帝理智的內在目標。（參見《神正論》第180-184節，第185節，第335節，第351節，第380節）

解釋：在永恆真理（數學和邏輯真理）的性質上萊布尼茨與笛卡爾派有著激烈的爭論。在笛卡爾派的意志主義（voluntarism）觀點看來，永恆真理完全依賴於上帝的意志，只要上帝願意，2加2完全可以等於5。而萊布尼茨則認為，永恆真理僅僅是存在於上帝的理智之中，上帝對於永恆真理只能發現和認同，而不能創造和更改。萊布尼茨與笛卡爾派的這個爭論，實際上是中世紀神學中阿奎那與鄧·司哥特（Duns Scotus）的爭論的繼續。在這一點上，萊布尼茨與阿奎那的觀點是一致的。

萊布尼茨認為，偶然的事實真理才依賴於上帝的意志，事實真理所相關的現實世界是上帝的意志根據最佳者原則從所有可能世界中挑選出來的最完滿者，並使其現實化。沒有上帝的意志，偶然真理就得不到說明。

Thus God alone is the primary unity or original simple substance, of which all created or derivative Monads are products and have their birth, so to speak, through continual fulgurations of the Divinity from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of the created being, of whose essence it is to have limits. (Theod. 382-391, 398, 395.)

• ‹ Previous
• 1
• 2
• 3
• Next ›
• Page