[ICONADA Research Team] From “Effort Leads to Reward” to “Why Bother Trying?”: The Emergence of an Incentive-Fragmented Society in Japan

1.When Society No Longer Believes in Effort

Every era has a phrase that captures its spirit.

Japan during its high-growth period believed: “If you work hard, you will succeed.”

After the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, society began to doubt: “Effort does not necessarily lead to success.”

Today, many young people in Japan increasingly believe:

“Success or failure is already predetermined; effort changes little.”

This psychological shift is at the core of the concept of the “Incentive Divide,” proposed by sociologist Takehiko Kariya.

Traditionally, inequality is understood through gaps in income, wealth, or education. However, Kariya argues that a deeper divide exists in people’s minds.

What separates social classes is not only access to resources, but expectations about the future.

When one group still believes effort has meaning while another has lost that belief, society becomes split by an incentive divide.

2. How “Relaxed Education” Created New Inequality

Ironically, Japan’s education system was once regarded as one of the most successful mechanisms for social equality in the world.

After World War II, Japan built a widely accessible and relatively high-quality public education system. Regardless of background, diligent students could enter good high schools, prestigious universities, and eventually secure stable employment in large corporations or the public sector.

This system formed one of the foundations of Japan’s middle-class society.

However, in the 1990s, the government introduced educational reforms known as *yutori kyōiku* (relaxed education).

The goal was to reduce the excessive pressure of exam competition, shorten curricula, and give students more space for creativity and independent learning.

Policymakers believed that if children were freed from intense academic pressure, they would become more creative and independent thinkers.

However, the results were very different from expectations.

Wealthier families quickly compensated for reduced school instruction by sending their children to cram schools (*juku*), private schools, and extracurricular programs.

Working-class families often lacked similar resources.

As a result, the relative equality once maintained by public education began to erode.

On the surface, all students gained more freedom.

In reality, their life trajectories increasingly diverged according to family background.

3. The Real Crisis Is Not Achievement Gaps, But Motivation Gaps

Kariya’s most important finding is not differences in academic performance.

Rather, it is the emergence of class-based differences in belief about the future.

Students from higher socioeconomic backgrounds still believe:

Studying leads to good universities.

Good universities lead to elite companies.

And effort ultimately translates into a better life.

Therefore, they continue to invest in education.

In contrast, many students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds develop a different perception:

Even if they study hard, their life outcomes may not improve significantly.

As a result, they disengage from academic competition.

This is what Kariya calls the “Incentive Divide.”

Traditionally, low achievement is interpreted as a lack of ability.

But incentive divide theory suggests that many students are not lacking ability—they are simply no longer convinced that effort is worthwhile.

When the myth of social mobility collapses, the motivation to learn collapses as well.

This is a far more dangerous form of inequality than unequal access to education alone.

Because it operates at the level of consciousness.

4. From School to the Workplace: The Continuation of a Lost Generation

This psychological pattern later extends into Japan’s labor market.

A longitudinal study by the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training (JILPT) shows that young people’s loyalty to corporations in Tokyo has steadily declined.

In the past, Japanese firms were based on the myth of lifetime employment.

Employees who demonstrated loyalty were rewarded with stability and social protection.

However, after the collapse of the bubble economy, this system gradually eroded.

More young people entered the labor market as part-time, temporary, or contract workers.

More importantly, the transition rate from non-regular employment to stable, full-time positions has decreased.

Young people increasingly realize:

Even if they work hard, they may not secure a stable career path.

Thus, a labor-market version of the incentive divide emerges.

Those with education, networks, and family support are still able to enter core employment tracks.

Others gradually accept non-regular work as a normal condition of life.

They are not unaware of the value of stable employment.

They simply no longer believe they can attain it.

Once this belief collapses, the willingness to strive naturally declines.

What appears to be passivity is, in fact, a rational adaptation strategy.

5. The Psychology Behind a “Low-Desire Society”

Many observers interpret Japan’s “low-desire society” as a cultural phenomenon.

Young people do not want to marry.

Do not want to buy homes.

Do not seek promotion.

Do not want to start businesses.

However, from the perspective of incentive divide theory, these behaviors share a common logic.

When people believe the future is worth investing in, they exert effort.

When they stop believing in returns, they reduce expectations.

Consumption declines.

Marriage rates decline.

Birth rates decline.

Entrepreneurship declines.

Career ambition declines.

Even emotional investment in relationships decreases.

This is not because young people lack dreams.

Rather, the cost of pursuing dreams has increased, while the probability of success has decreased.

Thus, reducing effort becomes the rational choice.

Low desire is not a personal preference—it is a structural outcome.

6. Japan’s Warning: The Real Danger Is the Loss of Hope

What is most alarming about Japan’s educational and social crisis is not declining test scores or economic stagnation alone.

The real danger is the erosion of a shared belief:

That effort can change the future.

Once this belief collapses, inequality is no longer just about income or wealth.

It becomes a divide in hope itself.

Children from affluent backgrounds continue to believe in the future.

Children from disadvantaged backgrounds gradually abandon that belief.

When education can no longer bridge this gap, it ceases to function as a ladder of mobility and instead becomes a mechanism of class reproduction.

From this perspective, Japan is not merely facing an education problem or an employment problem.

It is facing a crisis of social trust.

Because any society can endure economic inequality.

But very few societies can endure inequality in hope itself.

When young people begin to believe that effort no longer matters, what declines is not only the economy.

What declines is a society’s ability to imagine its own future.