20 For we experience in ourselves a condition in which we remember nothing and have no distinguishable perception; as when we fall into a swoon or when we are overcome with a profound dreamless sleep. In this state the soul does not perceptibly differ from a bare Monad; but as this state is not lasting, and the soul comes out of it, the soul is something more than a bare Monad. (Theod. 64.)

我們在自己身上體驗到一種情形，即我們對之沒有任何記憶且沒有任何可辨識的知覺；如我們陷入昏迷或深沉的無夢的睡眠的時候。在這種狀態下靈魂與赤裸的單子之間沒有可覺察的區別；但由於這一狀態是不持久的，靈魂會從中擺脫出來，靈魂是某種比赤裸的單子更豐富的東西。（參見《神正論》第64節）

21. And it does not follow that in this state the simple substance is without any perception. That, indeed, cannot be, for the reasons already given; for it cannot perish, and it cannot continue to exist without being affected in some way, and this affection is nothing but its perception. But when there is a great multitude of little perceptions, in which there is nothing distinct, one is stunned; as when one turns continuously round in the same way several times in succession, whence comes a giddiness which may make us swoon, and which keeps us from distinguishing anything. Death can for a time put animals into this condition.

這並不意味著，在這一狀態中單純實體沒有任何知覺。根據前面給出的理由這是不可能的；因為它不能在沒有某種性質也就是知覺的情況下停止存在或繼續存在。可是當一個人具有無數微小的知覺，其中卻無一清晰，這時他就昏迷了；就象朝某個方向連續轉圈若干次，會使我們頭暈目眩而昏厥，不能分辨任何東西。死亡能夠在某段時間內把動物置於這種狀態。

22. And as every present state of a simple substance is naturally a consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present is big with its future; (Theod. 350.)

既然單純實體的現在狀態是其前一狀態的自然結果，同樣地，它的現在就孕含了將來。（參見《神正論》第350節）

23. And as, on waking from stupor, we are conscious of our perceptions, we must have had perceptions immediately before we awoke, although we were not at all conscious of them; for one perception can in a natural way come only from another perception, as a motion can in a natural way come only from a motion. (Theod. 401-403.)

由於我們一從昏迷中覺醒過來就意識到知覺，我們在覺醒之前一定也具有知覺，盡管我們完全不能意識到它們；因為知覺只能以自然的方式源於另一（在先的）知覺，就象一個運動以自然的方式源於另一（在先的）運動①。（參見《神正論》第401-403節）

24. It thus appears that if we had in our perceptions nothing marked and, so to speak, striking and highly-flavoured, we should always be in a state of stupor. And this is the state in which the bare Monads are.

由此可知，如果我們知覺中沒有那些清晰的，也就是說，顯著的和極有特色的東西，我們就會永遠處於昏迷之中。而這正是赤裸的單子所處的狀態。

解釋：在第20－24節中，萊布尼茨認為人的無意識狀態與赤裸的單子是非常類似的，即都沒有任何清晰的知覺，從而說明赤裸的單子確實是存在的或至少其存在是可以設想的。萊布尼茨認為，無意識的知覺必然是存在的，否則單子就失去其恆存性而不成其為實體，人在昏迷或無夢的睡眠這些無意識狀態中就陷入死亡而無法蘇醒了。

25. We see also that nature has given heightened perceptions to animals, from the care she has taken to provide them with organs, which collect numerous rays of light, or numerous undulations of the air, in order, by uniting them, to make them have greater effect. Something similar to this takes place in smell, in taste and in touch, and perhaps in a number of other senses, which are unknown to us. And I will explain presently how that which takes place in the soul represents what happens in the bodily organs.

我們也看到，大自然通過賦予動物以感覺器官而給與了它們強化的知覺，這些感覺器官把無數的光線和空氣的波動收集起來，通過把它們結合起來而使其具有更顯著的效果。同樣的事情也發生於嗅覺、味覺和觸覺，以及大概不為人所知的一些其他的感官。我不久將解釋，為何在靈魂中所發生的事能夠反映感官中所發生的事。

解釋：動物的單子（靈魂）因具有感覺器官而擁有了較清晰的、有意識的、有記憶的知覺。至於物質性的感官何以能夠與無形體的靈魂相溝通這一問題，萊布尼茨用他的「前定和諧」理論加以解釋。

26. Memory provides the soul with a kind of consecutiveness, which resembles [imite] reason, but which is to be distinguished from it. Thus we see that when animals have a perception of something which strikes them and of which they have formerly had a similar perception, they are led, by means of representation in their memory, to expect what was combined with the thing in this previous perception, and they come to have feelings similar to those they had on the former occasion. For instance, when a stick is shown to dogs, they remember the pain it has caused them, and howl and run away. (Theod. Preliminary Discourse, sec. 65.)

記憶為靈魂提供一種連貫性，這種連貫性雖類似於理性，卻有必要與理性區別開來。我們注意到，如果動物以前曾被某物毆打，當它們又見到此物時，記憶中的表象會驅使它們去期待在以往的知覺中與該物相連的東西，它們會產生與以前的情形中類似的感受。例如，當人向狗舉起棍子的時候，狗會記起棍子曾造成的痛苦，就嚎叫著跑開了。(參見《神正論》初步論述，第65節)

27. And the strength of the mental image which impresses and moves them comes either from the magnitude or the number of the preceding perceptions. For often a strong impression produces all at once the same effect as a long-formed habit, or as many and oft-repeated ordinary perceptions.

那些刺激並驅動它們的心理印象的力量源於以往知覺的強度或數量。因為一個強烈的印象常立即產生與長期形成的習慣或許多經常重復的普通知覺相同的效果。

解釋：記憶使得動物能夠將特定的知覺聯系在一起形成習慣性的聯想，從而使動物的行為具有某種一貫性。