Comment

Comment by Host Studio yesterday

25.We see also that nature has given heightened perceptions to animals, from the care she has taken to provide them with organs, which collect numerous rays of light, or numerous undulations of the air, in order, by uniting them, to make them have greater effect. Something similar to this takes place in smell, in taste and in touch, and perhaps in a number of other senses, which are unknown to us. And I will explain presently how that which takes place in the soul represents what happens in the bodily organs.

我們也看到，大自然通過賦予動物以感覺器官而給與了它們強化的知覺，這些感覺器官把無數的光線和空氣的波動收集起來，通過把它們結合起來而使其具有更顯著的效果。同樣的事情也發生於嗅覺、味覺和觸覺，以及大概不為人所知的一些其他的感官。我不久將解釋，為何在靈魂中所發生的事能夠反映感官中所發生的事。

解釋：動物的單子（靈魂）因具有感覺器官而擁有了較清晰的、有意識的、有記憶的知覺。至於物質性的感官何以能夠與無形體的靈魂相溝通這一問題，萊布尼茨用他的「前定和諧」理論加以解釋。

26. Memory provides the soul with a kind of consecutiveness, which resembles [imite] reason, but which is to be distinguished from it. Thus we see that when animals have a perception of something which strikes them and of which they have formerly had a similar perception, they are led, by means of representation in their memory, to expect what was combined with the thing in this previous perception, and they come to have feelings similar to those they had on the former occasion. For instance, when a stick is shown to dogs, they remember the pain it has caused them, and howl and run away. (Theod. Preliminary Discourse, sec. 65.)

記憶為靈魂提供一種連貫性，這種連貫性雖類似於理性，卻有必要與理性區別開來。我們注意到，如果動物以前曾被某物毆打，當它們又見到此物時，記憶中的表象會驅使它們去期待在以往的知覺中與該物相連的東西，它們會產生與以前的情形中類似的感受。例如，當人向狗舉起棍子的時候，狗會記起棍子曾造成的痛苦，就嚎叫著跑開了。(參見《神正論》初步論述，第65節)

27. And the strength of the mental image which impresses and moves them comes either from the magnitude or the number of the preceding perceptions. For often a strong impression produces all at once the same effect as a long-formed habit, or as many and oft-repeated ordinary perceptions.

那些刺激並驅動它們的心理印象的力量源於以往知覺的強度或數量。因為一個強烈的印象常立即產生與長期形成的習慣或許多經常重復的普通知覺相同的效果。

解釋：記憶使得動物能夠將特定的知覺聯系在一起形成習慣性的聯想，從而使動物的行為具有某種一貫性。

Comment by Host Studio on July 10, 2025 at 9:02am

28. In so far as the concatenation of their perceptions is due to the principle of memory alone, men act like the lower animals, resembling the empirical physicians, whose methods are those of mere practice without theory. Indeed, in three-fourths of our actions we are nothing but empirics. For instance, when we expect that there will be daylight to-morrow, we do so empirically, because it has always so happened until now. It is only the astronomer who thinks it on rational grounds.

就其知覺的連貫性僅在於記憶的原則而言，人的行為類似於動物，就象經驗主義的醫生，只有實踐而缺乏理論。實際上，我們在自身的四分之三的行為上都是經驗主義者。例如，當我們預期明天會有白晝的時候，我們只是憑經驗，因為直到目前事情一直是這樣的。只有天文學家才能以理性的根據對此進行思考。

解釋：作為理性主義者，萊布尼茨認為只有普遍性的理性知識才使人與動物區別開來，人的經驗與動物的聯想並沒有本質不同。

29. But it is the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths that distinguishes us from the mere animals and gives us Reason and the sciences, raising us to the knowledge of ourselves and of God. And it is this in us that is called the rational soul or mind [esprit].

但只有必然的、永恆的真理才將我們與單純的動物區分開來，給予我們理性和科學，將我們提升到具有關於我們自身和上帝的知識。這就是我們之內所謂的理性靈魂或心靈。

30. It is also through the knowledge of necessary truths, and through their abstract expression, that we rise to acts of reflexion, which make us think of what is called I, and observe that this or that is within us；and thus, thinking of ourselves, we think of being, of substance, of the simple and the compound, of the immaterial, and of God Himself, conceiving that what is limited in us is in Him without limits. And these acts of reflexion furnish the chief objects of our reasonings. (Theod. Pref. [E. 469; G. vi. 27].)

也正是憑借必然真理的知識以及它們的抽象表達，我們才提升到具有反思活動，這使我們能夠思維所謂「自我」，並觀察到這或那處於「我們」之中；就這樣，通過思維自我，我們也就思維到存在、實體，思維到單純物和複合物，以及非實在之物和上帝自身，並設想在我們身上有限的卻會在上帝之中沒有限制。這些反思的活動為我們（當前的形而上學）①的推理提供了主要對象。（參見《神正論》前言，[E. 469; G. vi. 27]）

解釋：作為理性靈魂或心靈，憑借著對必然真理的理性知識的認識，而擁有了反思活動，具有了自我意識，並進而獲得了有關存在、實體、複合物、上帝等的哲學真理。值得注意的是，在萊布尼茨那里，自我意識與理性的反思能力緊密相連、密不可分，而對自我意識的反思則是形而上學的源泉。作為德國哲學之父，萊布尼茨的這種注重主體性的哲學傾向對德國古典哲學的發展有著非常深遠的影響。

第四部分 理性的兩大原則和兩種真理 （第31節—第37節）

31. Our reasonings are grounded upon two great principles, that of contradiction, in virtue of which we judge false that which involves a contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to the false; (Theod. 44, 169.)

我們的推理建立在兩大原則之上，其一為矛盾律，借助於這一原則，我們將包含矛盾者判斷為假，並將與假的相對立或相矛盾的判斷為真。（參見《神正論》第44節，第169節）

Comment by Host Studio on July 5, 2025 at 4:42pm

32.And that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known by us. (Theod. 44, 196.)

其二為充足理由律，借助於這一原則，我們認為，除非有為什麼是這樣而不是那樣的充足理由，否則就沒有事實是真實的或存在的，沒有陳述是正確的，盡管這些理由常常不為我們所知。（參見《神正論》第44節，第196節）

33.There are also two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and those of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible； truths of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, its reason can be found by analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and truths, until we come to those which are primary. (Theod. 170, 174, 189, 280-282, 367. Abrege, Object. 3.)

也存在著兩種真理，即推理的真理和事實的真理。推理的真理是必然的，其反面是不可能的；事實的真理是偶然的，其反面是可能的。當某個真理是必然的，其理由就可以通過分析而發現，可以將它分解為更簡單的觀念和真理，直到發現那些最基本的東西。（參見《神正論》第170節、第174節、第189節、第280－282節、第367節。節略，異議3）

解釋：萊布尼茨的理性的兩大原則矛盾律和充足理由律分別對應於兩種不同的真理，即推理的真理和事實的真理，或者必然的真理和偶然的真理。在他看來，推理的真理或必然真理指是指必然為真的同一性的陳述，即通過人的理性分析，可發現該陳述的謂詞包含語主詞之中。由此可知，與之相應的矛盾律的本質就在於a﹦a,因而萊布尼茨有時又將矛盾律稱為同一律（principle of identity）。他認為，邏輯學和數學就是建立在矛盾律或同一律的基礎上的，是相關於邏輯世界或可能世界的。

而事實的真理或偶然的真理則是相關於現實世界的陳述，並不必然為真，其反面總是可能的。例如，昨天雖然沒有下雨，但昨天也完全有可能下雨，這在邏輯上並不包含矛盾。也就是說，關於現實世界的陳述，至少就人的理性而言，不能視作謂詞包含於主詞之中的同一性陳述。那麼事實真理或偶然真理的真理性就不是源於矛盾律，而必須另有來源，即充足理由律。

34.It is thus that in Mathematics speculative Theorems and practical Canons are reduced by analysis to Definitions, Axioms and Postulates.

因而，在數學上思辨的原理和實踐的法則,可通過分析而歸結為定義、公理和公設。

Comment by Host Studio on July 3, 2025 at 9:05pm

35.In short, there are simple ideas, of which no definition can be given; there are also axioms and postulates, in a word, primary principles, which cannot be proved, and indeed have no need of proof; and these are identical propositions, whose opposite involves an express contradiction. (Theod. 36, 37, 44, 45, 49, 52, 121-122, 337, 340-344.)

最後，有一些不能給出定義的簡單觀念；還有一些公理和公設，即基本的原理，是不能證明的，也沒必要卻證明；這些是同一性的陳述，其反面包含著明顯的矛盾。（參見《神正論》第36節、第37節、第44節、第45節、第49節、第52節、第121－122節、第337節、第340－344節）

36.But there must also be a sufficient reason for contingent truths or truths of fact, that is to say, for the sequence or connexion of the things which are dispersed throughout the universe of created beings, in which the analyzing into particular reasons might go on into endless detail, because of the immense variety of things in nature and the infinite division of bodies. There is an infinity of present and past forms and motions which go to make up the efficient cause of my present writing; and there is an infinity of minute tendencies and dispositions of my soul, which go to make its final cause.

但充足理由也必須存在於偶然真理或事實真理，也就是說，存在於散布在創造物的世界中的事物的序列或聯系，在此，對特殊理由的分析可以進展到無窮的細節，因為自然界中的事物無比繁復以及物體可以無限分割。無數的現在和過去的狀態和運動構成了我當前寫作的動力因；而我靈魂中的無數的細微傾向和性情構成了它的目的因。

37.And as all this detail again involves other prior or more detailed contingent things, each of which still needs a similar analysis to yield its reason, we are no further forward；and the sufficient or final reason must be outside of the sequence or series of particular contingent things, however infinite this series may be.

由於所有這些細節又包含其他的在先的或更細微的偶然事物，而這些仍然需要同樣的分析來獲得其理由，這樣我們就不能再進一步了；充足的或最終的理由必須存在於特殊的偶然事物的序列之外，無論這一序列是如何無限。

解釋：作為事實真理的原則的充足理由律的內容很簡單，即沒有任何事物的存在或發生是沒有理由的，也就是說，對任何事情我們都可以追問「問什麼」。這一貌似空洞的原則至少有兩個重大的涵義：其一，它意味著世界有著自在的秩序，而且這種秩序在原則上能夠被理性所認識，這鮮明地表現出萊布尼茨哲學的理性主義色彩；其二，它被萊布尼茨用來引出對上帝存在的宇宙論證明，即由於事物之間的普遍聯系，對任一事物的充足理由的追朔都會延伸到整個世界，而世界作為整體的充足理由只能在世界之外，即超越的上帝。參見萊布尼茨《關於理性與神恩的基於理性的原則》第8節。

第五部分 上帝 （第38節—第46節）

Comment by Host Studio on June 30, 2025 at 9:22pm

Thus the final reason of things must be in a necessary substance, in which the variety of particular changes exists only eminently, as in its source; and this substance we call God. (Theod. 7.)

因而事物的最終理由必須存在於一個必然實體之中，在這一實體中，特殊變化的細節僅僅卓越地存在著，就像在其源頭一樣；我們將這一實體稱為上帝。（參見《神正論》第7節）

解釋：「卓越地」（eminently）與「形式地」（formally）相對應，為經院哲學術語，但在萊布尼茨時代仍很流行。甲「形式地」存在於乙中，是指甲物理地作為乙的一個部分而存在，如馬腿之於馬；而甲「卓越地」存在於乙中，不是就物理意義而是就解釋或邏輯意義而言，即乙是邏輯在先的，對甲的解釋要依賴於乙。

所謂「特殊變化的細節僅僅卓越地存在」於上帝之中，也就是說上帝是萬事萬物的充足理由。

39.Now as this substance is a sufficient reason of all this variety of particulars, which are also connected together throughout; there is only one God, and this God is sufficient.

這一實體是所有特殊事物的充足理由，而這些特殊事物是普遍相關聯的；只有一個上帝，而且這一上帝就足夠了。

解釋：由於上帝為世界提供了充足理由，而且上帝是其自身的充足理由，因而充足理由律的追問之鏈在上帝這里終結了，即只有一個上帝就足夠了。而如果存在多個上帝的話，又會引出一系列的「為什麼」，如每個上帝的特性是什麼，上帝之間的關係如何等等。在萊布尼茨看來，只有承認上帝的唯一性才能保證上帝是最終的充足理由。

40.We may also hold that this supreme substance, which is unique, universal and necessary, nothing outside of it being independent of it,—this substance, which is a pure sequence of possible being, must be illimitable and must contain as much reality as is possible.

我們還可得出，這一最高實體是唯一的、普遍的和必然的，沒有任何事物能在它之外而獨立於它，這一實體，作為可能存在的直接結果①，一定是沒有限制的，且包含盡可能多的實在。

解釋：「沒有任何事物能在它（上帝）之外而獨立於它」，這句話貌似斯賓諾莎的泛神論口吻，但萊布尼茨的意思並不是指萬物存在於上帝自身之中，而是指萬物處於超越的上帝的作用和統轄之中。可以用第38節中的經院哲學術語來解釋，即萬物卓越地而非形式地存在於上帝之中。

接下來，萊布尼茨按照安瑟爾謨的本體論證明的思路，從上帝的本質或觀念（可能存在）推出上帝必然存在。

Comment by Host Studio on June 24, 2025 at 8:06pm

41.Whence it follows that God is absolutely perfect; for perfection is nothing but amount of positive reality, in the strict sense, leaving out of account the limits or bounds in things which are limited. And where there are no bounds, that is to say in God, perfection is absolutely infinite. (Theod. Pref.22, [E. 469 a; G. vi. 27].)

由此可知，上帝是絕對完滿的；因為嚴格意義上的完滿性正是指積極實在性之全部，而將有限之物的局限和限度排除在外。在沒有局限之處，即在上帝中，完滿性是絕對無限的。（參見《神正論》序言 第22節[E. 469 a; G. vi. 27].）

解釋：在萊布尼茨那里，上帝的絕對完滿性和無限性的一個重要表現是，上帝的知覺是徹底清晰的，因而上帝得以作為純粹的精神而存在。而其他的單子的知覺則有不同程度的混亂，必須與一個形體相伴隨，因為形體正是混亂的知覺的某種產物，是單子的有限性和被動性的重要表現。

42.It follows also that created beings derive their perfections from the influence of God, but that their imperfections come from their own nature, which is incapable of being without limits. For it is in this that they differ from God. An instance of this original imperfection of created beings may be seen in the natural inertia of bodies. (Theod. 20, 27-30, 153, 167, 377－378，380；Abridgmet,obj.5.)

過本體論證明從上 帝的本質得出上存在。還可得出，創造物的完滿性源於上帝的影響，而其不完滿性則源於自身的不能沒有局限的本性。正是在此它們與上帝區別開來。創造物的原初的不完滿性的例證可在其軀體的自然的惰性中發現。（參見《神正論》第20節, 第20節, 第27-30節, 第153節, 第167節, 第377-378節, 第380節；節略，異議5）

解釋：上帝的創世並未創造事物的本質，事物的本質永恆地存在於可能世界之中。上帝的創世是指上帝挑選出一些事物的本質使其現實化，以構成一個所有可能世界中的最佳世界。因而創造物的局限性源於自身的本質或概念。

43.It is farther true that in God there is not only the source of existences but also that of essences, in so far as they are real, that is to say, the source of what is real in the possible. For the understanding of God is the region of eternal truths or of the ideas on which they depend, and without Him there would be nothing real in the possibilities of things, and not only would there be nothing in existence, but nothing would even be possible. (Theod. 20.)

同樣真實的是，上帝不僅是存在的源泉，也是本質的源泉，就本質是真實的而言，也就是說，是可能性中真實的東西的源泉。因為上帝的理智是永恆的真理或觀念的依附之處，沒有上帝就沒有任何在可能性中真實之物，不僅沒有任何東西存在，甚至沒有任何東西是可能的。（參見《神正論》第20節）

解釋：本質或觀念只要符合矛盾律，即不包含自相矛盾的東西，就是真實的，也就是說具有某種實在性，這些真實的本質或觀念只能存在於上帝的理智之中。這構成了萊布尼茨的另一個對上帝存在的證明。

44.For if there is a reality in essences or possibilities, or rather in eternal truths, this reality must needs be founded in something existing and actual, and consequently in the existence of the necessary Being, in whom essence involves existence, or in whom to be possible is to be actual. (Theod. 184-189, 335.)

如果在本質或可能性中，或者在必然真理中存在著某種實在，那麼這一實在就必須奠基於某種存在和現實之物，也就是必然實體的存在上，這種必然實體的本質包含了存在，或者在其中可能的都是現實的。（參見《神正論》第184－189節，第335節）

Comment by Host Studio on June 15, 2025 at 12:58pm

45.Thus God alone (or the necessary Being) has this prerogative that He must necessarily exist, if He is possible. And as nothing can interfere with the possibility of that which involves no limits, no negation and consequently no contradiction, this [His possibility] is sufficient of itself to make known the existence of God a priori. We have thus proved it, through the reality of eternal truths. But a little while ago we proved it also a posteriori, since there exist contingent beings, which can have their final or sufficient reason only in the necessary Being, which has the reason of its existence in itself.

因而只有上帝（或必然存在）才具有這一特權，即只要他是可能的就必然存在。既然什麼都不可能妨礙那不包含限制、否定，從而不包含矛盾的東西的可能性，這種可能性自身就足以先天地證明上帝的存在。我們曾通過永恆真理的實在性來證明上帝的存在（第43節）。而不久前我們也後天地對此進行了證明（第38節），因為存在著偶然的事物，它們的最後的或充足的理由只能在必然存在之中，而必然存在則在自身中有其存在的理由。

解釋：萊布尼茨在此提到了對上帝存在的三種證明，前兩種是先天的，即本體論證明和基於永恆真理的實在性的證明，第三種是後天的，即基於充足理由律的證明。

46. We must not, however, imagine, as some do, that eternal truths, being dependent on God, are arbitrary and depend on His will, as Descartes, and afterwards M. Poiret, appear to have held. That is true only of contingent truths, of which the principle is fitness [convenance] or choice of the best, whereas necessary truths depend solely on His understanding and are its inner object. (Theod. 180-184, 185, 335, 351, 380.)

我們不能像有些人，如笛卡爾和後來的波瓦雷①那樣，認為永恆的真理既然依賴於上帝，就是偶然的，依賴於上帝的意志。這一觀點只是對於偶然真理而言是真實的，偶然真理的原則是合適性或對最佳者的選擇，而必然真理則僅僅依賴於上帝的理智，是上帝理智的內在目標。（參見《神正論》第180-184節，第185節，第335節，第351節，第380節）

解釋：在永恆真理（數學和邏輯真理）的性質上萊布尼茨與笛卡爾派有著激烈的爭論。在笛卡爾派的意志主義（voluntarism）觀點看來，永恆真理完全依賴於上帝的意志，只要上帝願意，2加2完全可以等於5。而萊布尼茨則認為，永恆真理僅僅是存在於上帝的理智之中，上帝對於永恆真理只能發現和認同，而不能創造和更改。萊布尼茨與笛卡爾派的這個爭論，實際上是中世紀神學中阿奎那與鄧·司哥特（Duns Scotus）的爭論的繼續。在這一點上，萊布尼茨與阿奎那的觀點是一致的。

萊布尼茨認為，偶然的事實真理才依賴於上帝的意志，事實真理所相關的現實世界是上帝的意志根據最佳者原則從所有可能世界中挑選出來的最完滿者，並使其現實化。沒有上帝的意志，偶然真理就得不到說明。

Thus God alone is the primary unity or original simple substance, of which all created or derivative Monads are products and have their birth, so to speak, through continual fulgurations of the Divinity from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of the created being, of whose essence it is to have limits. (Theod. 382-391, 398, 395.)

Comment by Host Studio on June 9, 2025 at 9:32am

因而只有上帝才是最高的統一或原初的單純實體，所有的被創造的或派生的單子都是其產物，也就是說，通過上帝的一剎那一剎那的連續閃耀而產生，為創造物的接受性所限制，按其本質而言創造物是有限的。（參見《神正論》第382-391節，第398節，第395節）

① 波瓦雷（Pierre Poiret）,1646-1719,法國加爾文教牧師，定居於德國。他開始是笛卡爾主義者，後來受雅各·波墨影響成為宗教神秘主義者。譯者注17

解釋：新柏拉圖主義者喜歡用太陽散發出光芒來比喻神與萬物之間的關係，受此影響，萊布尼茨用閃電的連續閃耀來比喻上帝與萬物的關係。但萊布尼茨的「連續閃耀」很容易被誤解成笛卡爾的「連續創造」（continual creation）理論：即上帝在每一剎那都在重新創造萬事萬物。萊布尼茨此處的表述不夠嚴謹，實際上他的意思是指，上帝在創造萬物之後，仍然不斷地支撐或維系著萬物的存在，就像閃電不但產生了光亮，還通過其連續閃耀而維持光亮的存在。因為按照萊布尼茨的理論，上帝在創世之後就任憑事物按照他在創世之初所賦予的原則獨立活動，而不再另行干預了。笛卡爾的那種上帝不斷創造世界、不斷干預世界的理論在萊布尼茨看來無疑於把上帝視為一個糟糕的鐘表匠，要通過不斷地調自己制造出來的鐘表才能使時間走凖。

為什麼事物在被創造之後還需要上帝來維持其存在呢？我想萊布尼茨會這麼回答：觀念或本質是不包含存在的，存在完全是上帝的意志的賜予，如果上帝不以某種方式維持事物的存在，那麼他們就會喪失其現實存在而返回到可能世界之中。

48.In God there is Power, which is the source of all, also Knowledge, whose content is the variety of the ideas, and finally Will, which makes changes or products according to the principle of the best. (Theod. 7, 149, 150.) These characteristics correspond to what in the created Monads forms the ground or basis, to the faculty of Perception and to the faculty of Appetition. But in God these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect; and in the created Monads or the Entelechies (or perfectihabiae, as Hermolaus Barbarus translated the word) there are only imitations of these attributes, according to the degree of perfection of the Monad. (Theod. 87.)

在上帝中有力量，它是萬物的源泉，還有知識，其內容是觀念的細節，最後還有意志，它根據最佳者原則來改變或產生事物。（參見《神正論》第7節，第149節，第150節）這些特性相應於被創造的單子中的構成其主體或基礎 ①的東西、知覺能力和欲求能力。但在上帝中這些屬性是絕對無限或完滿的；而在被創造的單子或隱得來希（或「具有完滿性者」，如赫莫勞斯·巴勃魯斯 ②所譯）中所存在的，只是根據單子的完滿性程度，對這些屬性的模仿。（參見《神正論》第87節）

第六部分 單子間的關係（第49節—第60節）

49. A created thing is said to act outwardly in so far as it has perfection, and to suffer [or be passive, patir] in relation to another, in so far as it is imperfect. Thus activity [action] is attributed to a Monad, in so far as it has distinct perceptions, and passivity [passion] in so far as its perceptions are confused. (Theod. 32, 66, 386.)

就創造物具有完善性而言，它被認為是向外作用，就其是不完善的而言，它與他物的關係是承受性的或消極的。因而，就單子具有清晰的知覺而言，它具有積極性（活動），就其知覺是混亂的而言，它具有消極性（情感）。（參見《神正論》第32節，第66節，第386節）

50. And one created thing is more perfect than another, in this, that there is found in the more perfect that which serves to explain a priori what takes place in the less perfect, and it is on this account that the former is said to act upon the latter.

一個創造物之所以比另一個更完滿在於，在更完滿之物中能找到可先驗地解釋發生在較不完滿之物中的事情的理由，也正因此，前者被認為是作用於後者。

51. But in simple substances the influence of one Monad upon another is only ideal, and it can have its effect only through the mediation of God, in so far as in the ideas of God any Monad rightly claims that God, in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should have regard to it. For since one created Monad cannot have any physical influence upon the inner being of another, it is only by this means that the one can be dependent upon the other. (Theod. 9, 54, 65, 66, 201. Abrege, Object. 3.)

但在單純實體中，一個單子對另一單子的影響僅是觀念性的，只有通過上帝的中介才能發生效果，因為在上帝的觀念中，每一單子都有權要求，上帝在萬物之初規定其他單子的時候應該關注到它。既然一個被創造的單子不能對另一單子的內部存在具有任何物理的影響，那麼只有憑借這一方式一個單子才能依賴於另一單子。（參見《神正論》第9節, 第54節, 第65節, 第66節, 第201節；節略，異議3）

解釋：單子既然沒有可供外物出入的窗戶，單子間的相互作用就不可能是現實的，而只能是觀念性的：即每個單子都獨立的運動、變化，而彼此之間卻能夠保持一種協調性和一致性，顯得好像在相互作用似的。單子之間之所以能夠彼此協調，是由於上帝在創世之初的預先安排。在萊布尼茨看來，只有使一個單子與其它的所有單子保持和諧一致，才能使現實世界具有最高的完滿性和實在性。這就是他的「前定和諧」理論。

Comment by Host Studio on June 8, 2025 at 9:01am

52.Accordingly, among created things, activities and passivities are mutual. For God, comparing two simple substances, finds in each reasons which oblige Him to adapt the other to it, and consequently what is active in certain respects is passive from another point of view; active in so far as what we distinctly know in it serves to explain [rendre raison de] what takes place in another, and passive in so far as the explanation [raison] of what takes place in it is to be found in that which is distinctly known in another. (Theod. 66.)

因而，在創造物中能動與被動是相互的。當上帝比較兩個單純實體時，在每一個中都發現迫使他使另一個適應於它的理由，因而從一個角度看是主動的東西，從另一角度看則是被動的；它是主動的，是就我們在其中清晰地知道能夠解釋在另一實體中所發生的事而言，說它是被動的，是就在其中所發生的事的解釋須在我們於另一實體中所清晰地知道的東西中尋求而言。（參見《神正論》第66節）

53. Now, as in the Ideas of God there is an infinite number of possible universes, and as only one of them can be actual, there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God, which leads Him to decide upon one rather than another. (Theod. 8, 10, 44, 173, 196-199，225, 414-416.)

既然在上帝的觀念中具有無限多的可能世界，而只有其中之一才能成為現實的，那麼上帝的選擇就必須有一個充足理由，以使他選擇這一個而不是另一個。（參見《神正論》第8節，第10節，第44節，第173節，第196-199節，第225節，第414－416節）

54. And this reason can be found only in the fitness [convenance], or in the degrees of perfection, that these worlds possess, since each possible thing has the right to aspire to existence in proportion to the amount of perfection it contains in germ. (Theod. 74, 130，167, 201, 345-347,350，352，354.)

這一理由只能在這些世界所擁有的合適性或完滿性的程度中尋找，因為每一可能事物都有權要求與它所擁有的完滿性的多少相適應的存在。（參見《神正論》第74節，第130節，第167節，第201節，第345-347節，第350節，第352節，第345節）

55. Thus the actual existence of the best that wisdom makes known to God is due to this, that His goodness makes Him choose it, and His power makes Him produce it. (Theod. 8, 78, 80, 84, 119, 204, 206, 208. Abrege, Object. 1 and 8.)

也正因此，智慧使上帝認識到最佳者的實際存在，上帝的善使他選擇它，上帝的力量則使他產生它。（參見《神正論》第8節, 第78節, 第80節, 第84節, 第119節，第204節，第206節，第208節；節略，異議1，異議8）

56. Now this connexion or adaptation of all created things to each and of each to all, means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, and, consequently, that it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe. (Theod. 130, 360.)

這種所有創造物與每一創造物的聯系或適應，以及每一創造物對所有創造物的聯系和適應，意味著每一單純實體都具有表現所有其他單子的關係，因而，它是宇宙的一面永恆的活的鏡子。（參見《神正論》第130節, 第360節）

解釋：單子「是宇宙的一面永恆的活的鏡子」並不是說單子實際上表象著宇宙，而是說一個單子的與其他單子的和諧性，使其自身內部包含有所有與其他單子的關係，就好像在表象整個宇宙似的。也就是說，由於單子沒有窗戶，它只能表現自身。但由於單子包含了整個宇宙的關係，它自身就是個無比深邃的小宇宙，所以單子之表現自身也就是像在表象著宇宙。

57. And as the same town, looked at from various sides, appears quite different and becomes as it were numerous in aspects [perspectivement]; even so, as a result of the infinite number of simple substances, it is as if there were so many different universes, which, nevertheless are nothing but aspects [perspectives] of a single universe, according to the special point of view of each Monad. (Theod. 147.)

正如同一城市從不同角度去看，會顯得非常不同，好像因視角的不同而變成了許多城市；同理，由於有著無數多的單純實體，就好像有無數不同的宇宙，而這不過是從每一單子的獨特視角來觀看同一宇宙所產生的不同景觀。（參見《神正論》第147節）

Comment by Host Studio on June 5, 2025 at 9:56pm

58.And by this means there is obtained as great variety as possible, along with the greatest possible order; that is to say, it is the way to get as much perfection as possible. (Theod. 120, 124, 241, 214－243, 275.)

這就是獲得最大可能的多樣性同時又具有最大可能的秩序的方法；也就是說，它是獲得最大可能的完滿性的方法。（參見《神正論》第120節, 第124節，第241節, 第241－243節, 第275節）

解釋：「多樣性」與「秩序」是「完滿性」的不可或缺的兩個方面。僅有「多樣性」世界會一片混亂，僅有「秩序」世界會非常單調。在萊布尼茨看來，現實世界只有同時具有最大可能的「多樣性」與「秩序」，才是最完滿的，才能顯示出作為建築師的上帝的無比偉大。

59.Besides, no hypothesis but this (which I venture to call proved) fittingly exalts the greatness of God; and this Monsieur Bayle recognized when, in his Dictionary (article Rorarius), he raised objections to it, in which indeed he was inclined to think that I was attributing too much to God—more than it is possible to attribute. But he was unable to give any reason which could show the impossibility of this universal harmony, according to which every substance exactly expresses all others through the relations it has with them.

此外，唯有這一假設（我冒昧地認為它已獲得證明）才能恰當地贊美上帝的偉大；貝爾先生在他的辭典（「羅拉留」辭條）中提出反對意見時意識到了這一點，實際上他傾向於認為，我歸於上帝的太多了——超過了可能被歸於的。但他找不出任何理由來反對這種普遍的和諧，據此每一單子都通過它所具有的與所有其他單子的關係來確切地反映它們。

60.Further, in what I have just said there may be seen the reasons a priori why things could not be otherwise than they are. For God in regulating the whole has had regard to each part, and in particular to each Monad, whose nature being to represent, nothing can confine it to the representing of only one part of things; though it is true that this representation is merely confused as regards the variety of particular things [le detail] in the whole universe, and can be distinct only as regards a small part of things, namely, those which are either nearest or greatest in relation to each of the Monads; otherwise each Monad would be a deity. It is not as regards their object, but as regards the different ways in which they have knowledge of their object, that the Monads are limited. In a confused way they all strive after the infinite, the whole; but they are limited and differentiated through the degrees of their distinct perceptions.

進而，在我剛才所說的話中，可找到為什麼事物不可能是其他情形的先天理由。因為在上帝規定整體的時候必須考慮到部分，尤其是要考慮到每一單子。單子的本質既然在於表象，那就沒什麼能限制它只表象一部分事物；盡管這種表象在相關於整個宇宙的繁多的特殊事物時確實是混亂的，而只在相關於很小的一部分事物時是清晰的，即那些與它最接近或關係最大的事物；否則單子就會是神了。單子之受限制，不在於單子的對象，而在於認識對象的方式。他們都以混亂的方式追求著無限和全體；但他們因自身的知覺的清晰程度而受限制和相區別。 

解釋：值得注意的是，由於單子沒有可供外物出入的窗戶，嚴格地說，單子並不表象外物。但由於小宇宙與大宇宙之間的和諧一致，單子之表現自身也就是在表象宇宙了。由於單子的有限性，它對宇宙的表象必然是存在著不同程度的混亂，只有上帝才能完全清晰地表象宇宙。

第七部分 有機的自然觀 （第61節－第70節）

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